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This is a book chapter written for a British Society of Legal Scholars funded conference held at 
Durham University Law School. It develops a framework by which to evaluate the making of 
commercial law at the global level. It offers an approach to evaluating the process by which pri-
marily intergovernmental organisations produce commercial law. The approach grounds in both 
behavioural science and comparative law. The focus is mainly but not exclusively on global rule 
makers such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). It articulates what 
appears to be an emerging school of comparative law, which I call behavioural comparative law 
or BCL for short. BCL has the potential to advance substantially the ability to explain why com-
mercial law is produced the way it is at the global level. The discussion will lead us to findings 
about the methods that global commercial law makers use, how they choose areas of law to work 
on, and how they go about doing their work. This chapter finds that because of the cognitive limi-
tations on the participants in the global commercial law-making process, when feasible, global 
commercial law makers should use methods of cost-benefit analysis when evaluating project se-
lection or get as close to they can in doing so when cost-benefit analysis is not feasible. It may not 
usually be feasible, due to methodological constraints and the lack of data, though other quantita-
tive approaches might be able to substitute so long as they produce reliable results. The chapter 
also tentatively explores how cognitive constraints may be at work at the level of implementation 
of global commercial law at the domestic level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops a new framework by which to evaluate the making of commercial 
law on the global level. It offers a new approach to evaluating the process by which pri-
marily intergovernmental organisations produce commercial law. This approach grounds 
in both behavioural science and comparative law. The focus is mainly but not exclusively 
on global rule makers such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT). It articulates what appears to be an emerging school of comparative 
law, labelled behavioural comparative law or BCL for short, which has the potential to 
advance substantially the ability to explain why commercial law is produced the way it is 
at the global level. The discussion will lead us to findings about the methods that global 
commercial law makers use, how they choose areas of law to work on, and how they go 
about doing their work. This chapter finds that because of the cognitive limitations on the 
participants in the global commercial law-making process, when feasible, global com-
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mercial law makers should use methods of cost-benefit analysis when evaluating project 
selection or get as close to they can in doing so when cost-benefit analysis is not feasible. 
It will not usually be feasible, due to the lack of data and methodological constraints. 
Other methods of evaluation, designed to de-bias and around the statistical evaluation of 
evidence, should be used as much as is practical when cost-benefit analysis is not practi-
cal. 
Part I of this chapter explains that the current approach to global commercial law-
making is based in the expert judgment of traditional legal analysis. It examines how ex-
pert legal judgment has its origins in a prior era of codification and suffers from limita-
tions imposed on it by what is now an antiquated nineteenth century historical school of 
jurisprudence. Nineteenth century approaches to commercial legislation imposed strict 
limits on the avowed aim of any reform project as mainly to memorialise pre-existing 
rules that have evolved in a society. Prior commercial law reform projects were, moreo-
ver, strictly national in scope. With these limited aims the expert judgment of the lawyer 
may have been enough. Present-day projects, however, go well beyond this limited ‘me-
morialisation’ remit and into improving the law, substantial reform and modernisation, 
and facilitating cooperation among states. They are primarily normative projects. Expert 
judgment will remain indispensable in the production of global commercial law, but it 
will likely be insufficient on its own in many cases. 
Part II offers skeletal accounts of two dissenting or ‘external’ critiques of global 
commercial law-making, one grounded in rational choice theory in the American political 
economy school of thought and the other in a law and society approach. ‘External’ refers 
to approaches to the study of global commercial law-making that are not based in the dis-
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cipline or social practices of law. These external critiques offer significant insights. They 
are the most influential investigations of global commercial law-making based in the so-
cial sciences to-date. The political economy approach is now dated, and fresh inquiries 
seem required that relax its rational choice assumption, to explore the psychology of ex-
pert judgment in the global commercial law-making context. Law and society approaches 
offer detailed or ‘thick’ descriptions focusing predominantly on institutional structure, an 
approach that is illuminating but which investigates different questions from those inves-
tigated in behavioural science. 
Part III outlines an emerging school of thought known as behavioural comparative 
law (BCL). It explains why BCL offers substantial promise for improving our under-
standing of how global commercial law-making operates. BCL gets us closer to examin-
ing the behaviour of the participants in the law-making process and the mental processes 
that reliably predict that behaviour. It also informs us how to make better commercial 
law. 
Part IV applies BCL insights to global commercial law-making. It explores how cog-
nitive biases and motivated reasoning are likely in play in global commercial law-
making, resulting in obstacles in the selection of superior or improved legal norms for the 
legal products produced in these processes. It also offers examples of how biases and mo-
tivated reasoning can impede implementation of legal products produced in global com-
mercial law-making. Given the cognitive constraints likely at work in global commercial 
law-making, Part IV recommends the use cost-benefit analysis when feasible, and other 
complementary methods, as tools to de-bias the global commercial law-making process. 
- 5 - 
This chapter puts the discussion within the frame of comparative law for two com-
plementary reasons. First, one of the aims of this chapter is to make clear a school of 
thought known as BCL. This work needs to be done for its own sake, independent of its 
application to commercial law-making. Second, incorporating the methods and insights 
of behavioural science into comparative law should lead to improvements in understand-
ing how law is produced at the global level. Comparative law helps us to understand how 
to reform commercial law at the global level.1 With its substantial corpus on legal trans-
plants, law reform, harmonisation, unification, comparison, legal culture, and legal fami-
lies, comparative law offers an excellent framework for the study of global commercial 
law-making. 
Before moving on, let us get clear on terminology. I use the term ‘law-making’ as an 
umbrella concept to refer to a variety of rule-producing activities occurring at the global 
level. I spend little effort in parsing the intricacies of the meanings of terms such as ‘codi-
fication,’ ‘harmonisation’, ‘unification’, ‘reform’ and ‘modernization’ of law.2 There are 
some shorthand definitions if the reader feels the need to consult them. One of the very 
first documents UNCITRAL produced, ‘Unification of the Law of International Trade: 
Note by the Secretariat’ defines ‘unification’ of international trade law as ‘the process by 
which conflicting rules of two or more systems of national laws applicable to the same 
international legal transaction is replaced by a single rule.’3 Harmonisation, in contrast, is 
generally understood to refer to an approximation or co-ordination of legal rules and pol-
1 See Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014): 4-5. 
2 For an attempt at an explanation of the differences between ‘unification’ and ‘harmonization’, see Peter 
de Cruz, ‘Comparative Law: Functions and Methods, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 25 Feb 2019). 
3 UN Document A/C.6/L.72, Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
1970, Vol 1, 13-17.  
 
 
- 6 - 
 
icies in different jurisdictions by eliminating or minimizing major differences and creat-
ing minimum standards.4 ‘Codification’ can be understood as unification in the form of a 
code, but this definition just pushes the discussion down to the question of what is a 
‘code.’ ‘Reform’ is an ambiguous concept, but it is often at work whenever any organisa-
tion, domestic or international, formulates legal rules in some instrument. UNCITRAL’s 
mission, as stated in its founding documents, is the ‘progressive harmonisation and unifi-
cation of law’, with ‘progressive’ signalling ‘reform’.5 At UNCITRAL’s founding, de-
bate ensued in the United Nations as to whether UNCITRAL could ‘formulate’ law.6 
UNCITRAL’s mission moreover, includes the ‘modernisation’ of law.7 ‘Modernisation’ 
is yet another ambiguous concept, which carries particular connotations about the role of 
law in economic development.8 UNIDROIT engages in similar aims.9 The distinctions 
between these concepts can have political or rhetorical value to the agents who use them, 
but from an analytical standpoint, whatever these organisations do can be described using 
a simple rubric of global law-making. As we shall see later when the chapter turns to dis-
cussion of the relationship of historical jurisprudence to the development of commercial 
law, it is of limited usefulness to conceptualize developments of commercial law at the 
global level to simple memorialisation of formal law already in existence through some 
pre-existing approach to law formation, such as case law or customary evolution. Global 
                                                          
4 See WJ Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 485. 
5 Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A.  Res.  2205 (XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6594 (17 Dec 1966), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm (last accessed 25 Feb 2019). 
6 Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C Halliday, Global Lawmakers: International Organisations in the Crafting 
of World Markets (Cambridge University Press 2017) 62-64. 
7 See Part I.B below.  
8 See John Linarelli, Law, Rights, and Development, in John Linarelli (ed), Research Handbook on Global 
Justice and International Economic Law (Elgar 2013) 301. 
9 Statute of UNIDROIT, art 1, available at https://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/institutional-
documents/statute (last accessed 25 Feb 2019). 
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commercial law-making tends to be normative in its approach because decisions have to 
be made about the ‘right’ rules.  
I. GLOBAL COMMERCIAL LAW-MAKING: THE STATUS QUO 
This Part reflects on what lawyers do when they engage in the making of commercial law 
in the form of a legal product in the usual form of a convention or model law or in the 
production of a guide for national legislatures. The tool used almost exclusively in the 
relevant fora are those of the traditional lawyer. This part explores what the use of expert 
legal judgment entails and how it became firmly entrenched as the only method in play in 
global commercial law-making. 
 A. Expert Judgment: The Official Story 
Lawyers rule global commercial law-making. The expert judgment of the lawyer is by far 
the most common method for project selection and development in international organi-
zations with responsibilities in global commercial law-making. Clive Schmitthoff, char-
acterized by Susan Block Lieb and Terence Halliday as UNCITRAL’s ‘founding institu-
tional entrepreneur,’10 wrote a report in 1966 for the United Nations, which became one 
of the founding documents for UNCITRAL. In his report, Schmitthoff recommended that 
project identification requires ‘a thorough search for the right and ripe topics’ involving 
‘close collaboration between legal experts and trade experts’.11 The 1970 UNCITRAL 
document, ‘Unification of the Law of International Trade: Note by the Secretariat’, one 
of the first documents produced by UNCITRAL, captures the essence of using expert 
                                                          
10 Block-Lieb & Halliday (n. 6) 59. 
11 Ibid. 60. 
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judgment in project selection.12 The Secretariat noted that procedures have varied among 
organizations and according to the complexity and technical aspects of the subject, but 
invariably three steps are followed. The first step is the ‘selection of a subject appropriate 
for study and drafting’. The Secretariat continues:   
In some cases selection of subjects has been made by bodies of legal ex-
perts which have been requested by Governments concerned to consider 
appropriate projects for unification, while in other cases the topics were 
chosen by organs concerned with economic or technical matters in the 
light of the problems facing these bodies.13  
The second stage following section of a subject is the preparation of the problem, which 
includes ‘an analysis of the various laws and a consideration of the extent to which these 
laws fulfil certain economic or other practical ends.’14 The third stage is the drafting 
stage.15   
This three-stage procedure specified here might not reflect the complexity of actual 
practice over the course of UNCITRAL’s history and we could explore much more insti-
tutional detail, but UNCITRAL probably still approximately adheres to the essential as-
pects of these three steps. The procedure is an exercise in using the expert judgment of 
the lawyer along with intuition about the relevant economic conditions to be affected. 
John Spanogle, a former US delegate to several UNCITRAL Working Groups, including 
the Working Group that produced the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG), described UNCITRAL’s process for project selection as often starting with ‘the 
convening of a “group of experts” which meets over a long period of time in a Study 
                                                          
12 See (n 3). 
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Group to do initial investigation of issues. Then, representatives of States meet in a 
Working Group to draft the proposed convention – again over a long period of time.’16   
Debates about whether cost-benefit analysis is feasible or desirable to evaluate finan-
cial regulation include a focus on whether expert judgment is a sufficient or superior al-
ternative.17 Global commercial law-makers such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT lack 
remits over financial regulation, because of limitations formally imposed in their charters 
or informally imposed through a low-level politics among intergovernmental organiza-
tions and member governments, or simply because of historical trajectories as to which 
rule-making body does what.18 To further our understanding of the role of expert judg-
ment, it nevertheless will be helpful to examine the role of expert judgment in the crea-
tion and evaluation of financial regulation. John Coates, a proponent of the use of expert 
judgment in the making of financial regulation, explains: 
In the context of financial regulation, the judgment of regulatory staff is 
expert because the appointees of the financial agencies have generally 
spent their careers in and have developed specialized knowledge of fi-
nance, financial institutions, and financial markets. They have sharpened 
their intuitive sense of what kinds of regulations work and why – particu-
larly relative to non-experts, such as generalist judges. Such intuitions can 
be disciplined and informed in ways other than through CBA, such as 
through discussions with other experts (within or outside the agency); case 
studies, surveys, and polls; retrospective evaluations; regulatory experi-
ments that are deliberately adopted without specific predictions about how 
                                                          
16 John A Spanogle, Jr, ‘The Arrival of International Private Law’ (1991) 25 George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics 477, as quoted in Paul B Stephen, ‘Accountability and International 
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy (1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Busi-
ness 682, 713-714. See also John O Honnold, ‘The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law: Mission and Methods’ (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 201.  
17 John C. Coates IV, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications’ 
(2015) 124 Yale Law Journal 882; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulations: A Response to Criticisms’ (2015) Yale Law Journal Forum, 246; John C. Coates IV, ‘Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: A Reply’ (2015) Yale Law Journal Forum 305. 
18 Other global law makers, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, promulgate norms in the 
form of soft law or guidance for domestic regulatory agencies, which does involve the regulation of fi-
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they will turn out; and other forms of assessment that are not part of quan-
tified [cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation].19  
Similar considerations are relevant for commercial law-making. 
The US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, on ‘Regulatory 
Analysis’ provides some clarification of the concept of expert judgment, though it makes 
the case that it cannot be deployed without cost-benefit analysis.20 It states in a number of 
places that professional judgment has to be exercised when quantification is not realistic 
and to temper the use of quantified methods to avoid formulaic approaches to regulation.  
What is expert judgment? The standard answer would seem to be: reliance on the tra-
ditional tools of the lawyer, including reliance on the lawyer’s sense of what areas of law 
need improvement. Schmitthoff also mentioned the need for ‘trade experts’ in his report 
on the need for a UN organization but really his emphasis was on legal expertise to lead 
what was to be an organization dedicated to law-making. Expert judgment for global 
commercial law-making of the kind Schmitthoff (and others) envisioned amounts to what 
Philip Bobbitt calls the ‘modalities of legal argument’ to determine the truth of proposi-
tions about law.21 It is a focus on the distinctive internal logic and integrity of the actual 
social practice of legal argument. It is what Richard Posner characterizes as law as an 
                                                          
19 Coates, (n 17) 904 (footnotes omitted). 
20 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, 17 Sept. 2003, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.html. OMB Circular A-4 (last accessed 25 Feb 2019), 
continues the work of the Reagan Administration, which in the early 1980s, issued Executive Order 12,291 
mandating the use of cost-benefit analysis on all major US federal proposed regulation.  Matthew D. Adler 
& Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (Harvard University Press 2006) 3. 
21 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 1981). 
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‘autonomous discipline’,22 with no need for help from economics of any other social sci-
ence.23  
The expert judgment of the lawyer maintains a preclusive domination over global 
commercial law-making. Global commercial law-making is almost exclusively the realm 
of the traditional legal conceptualist. Normative welfare economics and its allied field, 
law and economics, which offer the most efficacious and pragmatic methods for evalua-
tion of large-scale legal reform, which global commercial law-making projects constitute, 
are almost entirely absent from the process. Law and economics scholars are noticeably 
absent, no doubt at least partly the result of the critical literature on the work of so-called 
private legislatures, discussed in Part II.A below. A significant law and economics litera-
ture, moreover, advocates piecemeal evolution of the law and contends that the US Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) is a misguided project.24 Two diametrically opposed posi-
tions have ignored each other for quite some time: legal conceptualists hail the UCC as a 
success while lawyer-economists critique it as resting on dubious empirical grounds and 
find its amending processes prone to capture by interest groups.  
B. The Persistent Influence of the Historical School 
The almost exclusive reliance on the expert judgment of the lawyer may be a relic of a 
by-gone era. Here we consider the question whether we rely too much on methods of the 
past when the mission of legal change has moved from codification of what was under-
                                                          
22 Richard Posner ‘The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987’ (1987) 100 Harvard 
Law Review 761. 
23 Perhaps expert judgment shares affinities with Henry Richardson’s notion of ‘intelligent deliberation’. 
Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy (Oxford University Press 2002)(Ch. 9, ‘The Stupidity of Cost 
Benefit Analysis). 
24 See e.g., Robert E. Scott, ‘The Rise and Fall of Article 2’ (2002) 62 Louisiana Law Review 1009; Lisa 
Bernstein, ‘An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence of the 
CESL’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 169. 
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stood to be existing law, to improving and modernizing the law, sometimes in dramatic 
ways, or in creating new law. Of course, one of the basic lessons in the application of so-
cial science methods to law is that what participants in any law-making process might say 
they are doing can differ substantially from what they actually do. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to understand how a school of jurisprudence well-understood by prominent law-
yers in the nineteenth century, the so-called historical school of jurisprudence, came to 
influence lawyers in the past and how its methods carried on well beyond the sell-by date 
of this particular school of jurisprudence.   
A substantial movement to legislate commercial law on a national scale began in the 
late nineteenth century. The movement involved codification, a form of nationalising 
commercial law and putting it in the form of a set of positive declarations, away from a 
conception of law held by many lawyers and judges of the time that commercial law ei-
ther evolved from or was custom, in the form of a law merchant. This move to legislate 
turned what was known as mercantile law or the law of merchants into what we call 
commercial law today. Whether or not a law merchant transcending the state’s control 
existed or not is beside the point; it was a notion accepted by many in centuries past but 
was the subject of some tension in the nineteenth century, in an era of the modern state in 
which positive law became an important source of law.25   
The period in which this legislative innovation occurred was an era of economic 
globalisation, from about the mid-nineteenth century until World War I. The next great 
era of economic globalisation began in the 1990s and continues today, rising from the 
                                                          
25 For a survey of contested theories about the law merchant, see John Linarelli, ‘Commercial Law and 
Global Legal Pluralism’, in Paul Schiff Berman ed, Oxford Handbook on  Global Legal Pluralism (Oxford 
University Press forthcoming 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3285315 (last accessed 13 May 2019). 
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end of the Cold War with the liberalisation of global capital movements in the aftermath 
of the erosion of the Bretton Woods financial system.26  
As a national movement, codification had a political aim. In that prior era of econom-
ic globalisation, the push to nationalise commercial law was a means by which to consol-
idate state power, either to establish a common market within the state or to put the state 
firmly in control of all normative orders that could be considered legal in pedigree.27 To 
consolidate state power, it was considered necessary to liberalise national markets and 
make them more compatible for the industrial economy. Nineteenth century nationalism 
in commercial law reform occurred at a time before there were intergovernmental organi-
sations such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT. The first German code was the Allge-
meines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch, a commercial code for what was then the German 
Confederation.28 The German Civil Code was the product of Imperial Germany and came 
later.29 In the United States, the first uniform commercial legislation came into existence 
in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, largely modelled on English legisla-
tion.30 This first US legislative effort was largely driven by the need for uniformity of 
                                                          
26 For a brief outline of this history, see John Linarelli, Margot E Salomon & Muthucumaraswamy Sornara-
jah, The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with Injustice in the Global Economy (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2018).  
27 See Michael John, Politics and the Law in Late Nineteenth Century Germany: The Origins of the Civil 
Code (Oxford University Press 1989). 
28 See David M Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to History 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
29 John (n 27). 
30 See, e.g, Samuel Williston, ‘The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code’ (1950) 63, 
Harvard Law Review 561, 564. Williston said in favour of the US Uniform Sale of Goods Act over Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 2: 
Moreover, the extensive commerce of and elsewhere has made the English Sale of Goods 
Act the recognized statement of the common law, as distinguished from the civil law. The 
wide enactment in the United States of the Uniform Sales Act, identical in most respects 
with the British Act, has strengthened this assumption. The British statute was intended 
to be a codification of the English common law, which had been largely formulated in the 
treatises of Blackburn and of Benjamin. There is no indication that the English Sale of 
Goods Act will be repealed or materially amended. Except in a few respects the Ameri-
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commercial law across a geographically dispersed common market.31 In England and 
Wales, legislation was the final step in getting mercantile law firmly into the category of 
state law, if there ever was a doubt by the nineteenth century. 
It is reasonable to say that nineteenth century legislative reformers relied on expert 
legal judgment on how commercial legislation should be drafted but we must put their 
use of this judgment in historical context. We need to understand how lawyers of the time 
conceptualised law and legislation. Many lawyers of this era believed that legislative en-
actments of commercial law should go no further than codifications or legislative enact-
ments of pre-existing law. Progressive development, formulation of new legal rules, or 
modernisation were not practices that a nineteenth century lawyer involved in this work 
could endorse, at least not officially, though what they said they were doing and what 
they actually did could diverge.32 Sir MacKenzie Chalmer’s address to the American Bar 
Association in 1902 illustrates the approach. Chalmers was the principal author of two of 
the most often copied pieces of commercial legislation in the common law tradition, the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1883 and the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Chalmers explained his ap-
proach to legislating commercial law in his American Bar Association address: ‘When 
the principles of the law are well settled, and when the decided cases that accumulate are 
can Sales Act followed the English statute both in substance and in the use of identical 
words. When the American Act was drafted it was thought to be of considerable ad-
vantage that the statute so closely resembled the English statute. This advantage has sub-
sequently been increased by the wide adoption of the English statute, especially in the 
provinces of Canada. (footnotes omitted). 
31 The usual argument is that the US Supreme Court decision of Swift v Tyson, 41 U.S. 916 Pet.) 1 (1842) 
failed to achieve uniformity through the judiciary and that uniform legislation was needed. See, e.g., Grant 
Gilmore, ‘On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law’ (1948) 57 Yale Law Journal 1541.  
32 See Roy Goode & Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (Penguin 5th ed 2016) 209 (The Sale 
of Goods Act 1893 was partly a restatement of existing common law on sales and partly a departure). 
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mere illustrations of accepted general rules, then the law is ripe for codification.’33 He 
also explained: ‘The province of a code, I venture to think, is to set out, in concise lan-
guage and logical form, those principles of the law which have already stood the test of 
time. It co-ordinates and methodizes, but does not invent, principles.’34 To get to the 
point of being able to write such legislation, Chalmers recommended doing a digest of 
the law first, to synthesize the law as it is found in the existing case law. Something like 
this practice continues to this day in the production of American restatements, though re-
statements have different aims than the projects of relevance to this chapter.35   
This was a time when the school of historical jurisprudence, now almost entirely for-
gotten except by historians of legal thought, competed with positivist approaches to the 
                                                          
33 MD Chalmers, ‘Codification of Mercantile Law’ (1902) 25 Annual Reports of the American Bar Associa-
tion 282, 283. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The American Law Institute Style Manuel provides as follows: 
Like a Restatement, the common law is not static. But for both a Restatement and the 
common law the change is accretional. Wild swings are inconsistent with the work of 
both a common-law judge and a Restatement. And while views of which competing rules 
lead to more desirable outcomes should play a role in both inquiries, the choices general-
ly are constrained by the need to find support in sources of law. 
An unelected body like The American Law Institute has limited competence and no 
special authority to make major innovations in matters of public policy. Its authority de-
rives rather from its competence in drafting precise and internally consistent articulations 
of law. The goals envisioned for the Restatement process by the Institute’s founders re-
main pertinent today: 
It will operate to produce agreement on the fundamental principles of the com-
mon law, give precision to use of legal terms, and make the law more uniform 
throughout the country. Such a restatement will also effect changes in the law, 
which it is proper for an organization of lawyers to promote and which make the 
law better adapted to the needs of life. (emphasis added in original) 
Capturing the Voice of The American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters and Those Who Re-
view Their Work (Washington DC: American Law Institute 2015): 6. The Harvard Law School Library 
website guidance on sources offers the following description: 
Restatements are highly regarded distillations of common law. They are prepared by the 
American Law Institute (ALI), a prestigious organization comprising judges, professors, 
and lawyers. The ALI's aim is to distill the ‘black letter law’ from cases to indicate trends 
in common law, and occasionally to recommend what a rule of law should be. In essence, 
they restate existing common law into a series of principles or rules. 
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309942&p=2070280 (last accessed 25 Feb 2019). 
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law.36 Legal historians are now reassessing the significance of historical jurisprudence 
and finding that it may have had more influence than previously thought, at least in the 
United States where commercial law codification was ever on the forefront of legal de-
velopments of the time.37 This is not the place for a detailed exposition of the historical 
school, assuming that it even formed a coherent school of thought, but suffice to say that 
historical jurisprudence offered a dim view of legislation. The historical jurisprude saw 
legislation as not really law but politics, as an interference with the evolution of law, un-
less it was undertaken after serious study of the law as a historical science and then un-
dertaking of codification of existing law.38 So, if legal entrepreneurs of the time were to 
get their legislative efforts to be accepted, it was imperative that they stylize any legisla-
tive interventions as merely codifications of pre-existing law. They could then be seen to 
have accommodated the competing interests of the status quo, supported by historical 
jurisprudence, and reform, supported by the competing school of thought, analytical ju-
risprudence. Whether the national legislative achievements of the late nineteenth century 
only codified pre-existing law is an empirical question beyond our scope here. The point 
for our purposes is only that for a good many prominent lawyers of the time, this was at 
least in their ‘legal consciousness’ as the proper way to proceed.39  
That legal entrepreneurs influenced by the ascendant schools of jurisprudence of the 
time sought only to codify existing law did not mean they were provincial in outlook. 
Chalmers (and his contemporaries) still looked to a law merchant transcending the state 
                                                          
36 Rabban (n 28). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. at 14. 
39 See Duncan Kennedy, ‘Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Clas-
sical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940’ (1980) 3 Research in Law and Sociology 3.  
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for settled principles. Roscoe Pound characterised commercial lawyers of his day as cos-
mopolitan in outlook while contrasting private lawyers of the time as tribal in clinging to 
national traditions.40 Pound was prescient, advocating a uniform commercial law pro-
duced ‘through the adoption in different states of uniform statutes worked out by interna-
tional conferences.’41 He said this at a time when the first wave of uniform legislation 
was working itself through the state legislatures of his home country the United States 
and when substantial interaction between British and American lawyers on how uniform 
legislative efforts should proceed was frequent.42  
In contrast to the resistance to legislative and non-evolutionary change of the histori-
cal school, modernisation of law was an ascendant idea when UNCITRAL was formed. It 
is embedded in UNCITRAL’s constitutional framework.43 Modernization theory, em-
                                                          
40 Roscoe Pound, ‘Uniformity of Commercial Law on the American Continent’ (1909) 8 Michigan Law 
Review 91. It is difficult to say whether Pound’s views were more or less universally held, but a perusal of 
the commentary of the time suggests he was not an outlier on these points. Pound was one of the founders 
of the school of thought known as sociological jurisprudence, a middle way between analytical and histori-
cal schools of jurisprudence of the nineteenth century and presaging American Legal Realism, which 
brought us the American Uniform Commercial Code. See David Wigdor, Roscoe Pound, Philosopher of 
Law (Greenwood Press 1974); NEH Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching for an American 
Jurisprudence (University of Chicago Press 1997). 
41 Pound (n 40) 98. 
42 One only needs to read the scholarship of MD Chalmers to get this point. See, e.g., Chalmers (n 33); MD 
Chalmers, ‘Codification of Commercial Law’ (1902-03) 2 Canadian Law Review 146; MD Chalmers, ‘Ex-
periment in Codification’ (1886) 2 Law Quarterly Review 125. 
43 On the earliest documents of a constitutional nature for UNCITRAL is ‘Progressive Development of the 
Law of International Trade: Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ (1966). The Report 
states: 
The developing countries of recent independence have had the opportunity to participate 
only to a small degree in the activities carried out up to now in the field of harmonization, 
unification, and modernization of the law of international trade. Yet those are the coun-
tries that especially need adequate and modern laws, which are indispensable to gaining 
equality in their international trade.  In many of these States the prevailing legal system 
was introduced before their independence by the metropolitan countries; often the provi-
sions thus received are unsuitable to their present stage of economic development or to 
the requirements of newly independent states.  The unification process in the field of in-
ternational trade law would be a step in the direction of remedying this situation. (foot-
notes omitted) 
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ployed principally by political scientists and political economists, is formed around the 
claim that economic development links casually to social and political change, usually in 
the form of a change toward liberal democracy.44 When modernization theory first came 
to prominence in political science in the 1950s and 1960s, the field of law and develop-
ment also began to form as area of inquiry and as consulting on law reform and legal ed-
ucation in developing countries. Its rise tracked closely with the rise of modernization 
theory in political science. A functioning, modern legal system was seen as essential for a 
modern, then industrial, economy.45 A modern legal system was seen as essential for po-
litical and social development, with the idea being that a modern legal system would help 
to catalyse a move towards liberal democracy in which pluralism would flourish and rule 
of law would curtail arbitrary state action and help to bring about social change.46 UN-
CITRAL was formed at a time when post-war decolonisation and the development of the 
state was very much on the agenda of international organisations. Reliance on modernisa-
                                                                                                                                                                             
 To remedy the shortcomings described above, several measures such as the following 
should be taken. The process of harmonization and unification of the law of international 
trade should be substantially systematized and accelerated. This would entail a concerted 
effort to secure a wider participation in existing international conventions and a wider 
adoption of uniform legislation, where such conventions and uniform laws reflect the 
present requirements of world trade, as well as a wider use of standard trade terms, provi-
sions and practices. It would also entail action towards further unification and moderniza-
tion of legal techniques in this area, such as the adoption of new international conven-
tions and uniform laws, codification of existing rules and trade practices and the dissemi-
nation of information on up-to-date methods and solutions. In addition, it would be desir-
able to secure a broad participation of the developing countries of recent independence in 
the progressive development and codification of the law of international trade; this would 
facilitate the adoption by those countries of laws and other measures adequate for the pro-
tection of the interests of their international trade transactions. Finally, it would be appro-
priate to bring about a close co-ordination of the activities of the existing formulating 
agencies, regardless of whether their members belong to one or another economic or legal 
system. 
44 Shari Berman, ‘What to Read in Modernization Theory, (2009) Foreign Affairs, 12 March, available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-03-12/what-read-modernization-theory. 
45 David M Trubek, ‘The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future’, in David M 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge Universi-
ty Press 2006) 74-94. 
46 David M Trubek & Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in 
Law and Development Studies in the United States’ (1974) Wisconsin Law Review 1062, 1073-1074. 
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tion by the United Nations of the time is analogous to reliance on governance later when 
the World Bank sought to work around the restrictions in its Articles of Agreement pro-
hibiting it from promoting human rights.47 Modernisation as an ideal may have changed 
meaning over the years to refer not so much to bringing democracy to former colonies 
but to promoting liberal global market orders. For our limited purposes, we can conclude 
with some certainty that (i) modernisation of law as it is understood in the mid-twentieth 
century differs in substantial respects from any modernisation by nineteenth century legal 
codifiers and (ii) modernisation as an aim of current law-making bodies entails something 
more than simple ‘memorialisation’ or codification of pre-existing legal norms.  
We come to the problem: lawyers reforming, progressively developing, formulating, 
and modernising law still seem to adhere to the methods of Chalmers and others who 
needed to accommodate competing jurisprudential tensions in the prior era of economic 
globalisation, but their developing, formulating, and modernising tasks far outreach the 
ambitions of nineteenth century drafters and are now robustly global in scope.48 If all we 
are doing is codifying pre-existing domestic law that already existed in the form of case 
law or fragmentary legislation, then reliance on expert judgment in the law is probably 
enough. In fact, that is what historical jurisprudes advocated – a deep, rich historical 
scholarship.49 In these codifications, we would only be seeking the expert’s opinion on 
the state of the law and how to draft it into legislative form. These are the skills of the 
lawyer. The only concern in comparing the status quo to the proposed situation would be 
in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of legislative intervention. But if law re-
                                                          
47 Ibrahim FI Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) Ch 18 (Human 
Rights and International Financial Institutions). 
48 For an account based in law and sociology, see Block-Lieb & Halliday (n 6) explored in section D below.  
49 Rabban (n 28) 12-14. 
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formers seek to improve the law and need to cross borders where there may be no settled 
precedent or legal rules to codify, or where legal rules are not entirely compatible or even 
conflict across jurisdictions, will the expert judgment of the lawyer alone suffice? In the 
present day, no intellectual movement of global scope pulls lawyers towards simple legis-
lative restatements of pre-existing law. Consistent with modernization arguments, global 
commercial law-making now in many forms produces change, often substantial, and is 
indeed designed to promote change50, to improve the law, to fill gaps, to produce whole-
cloth a new uniform law or international convention, or to produce cooperation among 
states in areas in which externalities are present.51 That their texts promote these aims, 
however, does not mean that actual legal change necessarily results.52 The limited point 
here is that a memorialisation or ‘sticking to existing law’ constraint do not exist when 
the drafters of these instruments do their work.  
Why are the current operating methods for global commercial law-making largely 
continuous with methods made prominent in the prior era of economic globalisation? It is 
difficult to say without further empirical or experimental investigation. The behaviour of 
those involved in commercial law reform, however, is plausibly consistent with a form of 
path dependence characterized as ‘behavioural lock in,’ which can produce difficulties in 
                                                          
50 There are many examples. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
Services is an example of a model law that seeks to promote substantial change in domestic law. Much has 
changed since the first book on comparative and international public procurement law was published. See 
Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli, & Don Wallace Jr., Regulating Public Procurement: National and Inter-
national Perspectives (Kluwer/Aspen 2000). Another is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transac-
tions, which promotes significant change in secured lending based on the US UCC Article 9. 
51 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency is an example of a cooperation-facilitating 
instrument. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, UNCITRAL, 
30th Session, at 3, UN Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997), reprinted in (1997) 28 UNCITRAL Yearbook 305.   
52 To appreciate the distinction, see, e.g. John F Coyle, “The Role of the CISG in US Contract Practice: An 
Empirical Study (2016) 38 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 195 (on how practi-
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reversing situations because of learning and habituation.53 It occurs when an agent’s be-
haviour is ‘stuck’ in a particular and sometimes sub-optimal position ‘due to habit, organ-
isational learning, or culture.’54 Behavioural lock-in can result when professionals reject 
new standards when these standards could reduce their power or autonomy. Training can 
facilitate path dependence. Lawyers may have a professional concern from being asked to 
accept a situation beyond their training.55 Training is a form of organisational learning 
within groups and among professionals and becomes a source of power. Once a behav-
iour embeds, then status quo bias makes change ever more difficult. A plausible argu-
ment can be made that the prior more traditional methods of law-making have a grip on 
our beliefs and attitudes as lawyers engaged in global commercial law-making.  
II. THE DISSENTERS: PREVAILING EXTERNAL POINTS OF VIEW 
More international collaboration to improve commercial law always results in better law 
because experts gather to make it so. How can making the law better be a bad thing? 
Such arguments beg many questions. External observers of global commercial law-
making question the unexamined premises of such positions. ‘External’ refers to methods 
of inquiry about global commercial law-making that do not depend on the discipline or 
the social practice of law-making itself. This Part offers skeletal surveys of the two most 
                                                          
53 William Barnes, Myles Gartland, & Martin Stack, ‘Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and Behav-
ioural Lock-In’ (2004) 38 Journal of Economic Issues 371; Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Path Dependence in the 
Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System’ (2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 
601. For applications to corporate law, see Reinhard H Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, ‘Path Dependence, 
Corporate Governance and Complementarity’ (2002) 5 International Finance 311; Lucian A Bebchuk & 
Mark J Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford 
Law Review 127. 
54 Barnes, Gartland, & Stack (n 53). 
55 See Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Green Eggs and Ham: The CISG, Path Dependence, and the Behavioural Economics 
of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in International Sales Contracts’ (2010) 6 Journal of Private International 
Law 417; John Linarelli, ‘The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Law Making’ (2003) 48 Wayne 
Law Review 1387. 
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influential social science critiques of global commercial law-making, one grounded in the 
American political economy school and the other in law and sociology. Inquiry about 
law-making processes using theory, methods, and evidence of the social sciences has 
produced scepticism about the efficacy of global commercial law-making. The limits of 
these approaches are also briefly explored.  
A. Dissenters I: Political Economy 
Anyone who has read into the law and economics literature on so-called private legisla-
tures will discover disagreement between those who hold positive views of the work of 
domestic and global commercial law makers and those who do not.56 The disagreement is 
sharp, with some going so far as to critique the American UCC project, widely consid-
ered by many lawyers in the United States and beyond as a huge success.57 It reflects is a 
longstanding fault line between legal doctrinalists and law and economics scholars.  
The critique comes in particular from the American political economy school of 
thought, with its foundations in positive political theory and public choice theory. In 
summary, the argument, developed primarily by Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, is that 
private legislatures produce two kinds of legal rules, depending on the structure of their 
                                                          
56 Clayton P Gillette & Robert E Scott, ‘The Political Economy of International Sales Law’ (2005) 25 In-
ternational Review of Law and Economics 446; Paul B Stephan, ‘The Futility of Unification and Harmoni-
zation in International Commercial Law’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 743; Edward J 
Kanger, ‘Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bot-
tom’ (1998) 83 Iowa Law Review 569; Paul B Stephan, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking: 
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy’ (1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 681; 
Larry E Ribstein & Bruce H Kobayashi, ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’ (1996) 25 Jour-
nal of Legal Studies 131; Alan Schwartz & Robert E Scott, ‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’ 
(1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 595; Steven L Schwarcz, ‘A Fundamental Inquiry into 
the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislature’ (1995) 29 Georgia Law Review 909; Robert E 
Scott, ‘The Politics of Article 9’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1783; 
Kathleen Patchel, ‘Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from 
the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1993) 78 Minnesota Law Review 83. For a rebuttal of some of the argu-
ments, see Linarelli (n 55). 
57 It is worth reading Scott (n 24) to appreciate at least some of the native critiques of the UCC. 
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decision-making process and the incentives the participants in the law-making process 
have.58 Model I rules are specific rules, usually ‘bright line’ in the sense that they require 
the application of objective facts to determine whether the rule criteria are met. Model II 
rules are more abstract and general, tending to rely more on the concepts like reasonable-
ness and leaving it to the discretion of the decision maker on the application of the rule.59 
The predictions of this research proceeds as follows. A law-making organization will 
produce Model II rules when the incentives of the delegates are to promote getting some-
thing done and widespread adoption. This is often the case, so the research concludes, 
because of the reputational benefits, prestige, and future work associated with a success-
ful law-making project.60 The usual example offered for Model II rules is the CISG.61 
Because of the emphasis on widespread adoption and getting something done upon which 
one can affix one’s name, most products that private legislatures produce are substantial-
ly based in Model II rules.62 A global law maker will produce a product with Model I 
rules when delegates are overwhelmingly from a single industry and the rules are de-
signed to favour that industry. Paul Stephan offers the example of the Uniform Customs 
and Practices for Documentary Credits, produced by the International Chamber of Com-
merce, an industry group, as an example of a product with Model I rules.63 These cri-
                                                          
58 Schwartz & Scott (n 56). 
59 Ibid. Schwartz and Scott also explicate a Model III rule, which combines elements of Model I and Model 
II rules, but lumps Model III rules into Model II for purposes of analysis.  
60 See Gillette & Scott (n 56). 
61 Ibid.; Stephan, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking’ (n 56). 
62 Schwartz & Scott (n 56); Gillette & Scott (n 56). 
63 Stephan, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking (n 56). 
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tiques are more widely replicated in the study of experts in regulatory contexts, though 
not specifically around Model I and II rules.64   
The political economy research on private legislatures provides important insights but 
has several limitations. Its rational choice assumptions should be revisited. Its predictive 
or explanatory power is ready for re-examination based on advances in behavioural eco-
nomics and the behavioural sciences more generally. A focus on behaviour would re-
move the need to focus on misaligned incentives.65 Moreover, how global commercial 
law-making has proceeded does not fit well in these models. On the global level this lit-
erature has focused on international conventions, but global commercial law makers now 
produce relatively few of these. The move has been well underway for quite some time 
towards soft law in the form of model laws and guides, reflecting a shift from unification 
or harmonisation to modernisation. While no empirical work exists on this subject, it ap-
pears, based on a tentative look at the evidence, that global commercial law-making now 
produces products that contain an appreciable number of Model 1 rules, even with the 
participation in the process of diverse interests. Finally, the rational choice literature has 
remained an outlier in the discussion of global commercial law-making because it does 
not deal with questions that legal comparativists explore, such as the role of culture. 
These limitations put into question whether the existing models are sufficiently predic-
tive. 
 
                                                          
64 See Oren Perez, ‘Can Experts be Trusted and What Can be Done About It? Insights from the Biases and 
Heuristics Literature’ in Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European 
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B. Dissenters II: The Other Chicago School 
Another ‘external’ approach to the study of global commercial law-making is the ‘other’ 
Chicago School, to distinguish it from the Chicago School of economics.66 This Chicago 
School is one in sociology. It is best known for its work in the study of urban communi-
ties in Chicago though its research methods are generalizable. One of its most well-
developed approaches is one of social ecologies, in which the research digs deep into 
qualitative fieldwork to study relevant actors and institutions. Recent work by Susan 
Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday offers insights into the law-making processes of UN-
CITRAL, with a focus on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.67  
An ecological method, quite simply, focuses on the interactions of actors in an envi-
ronment. It offers a rich account of institutional detail. It is ethnographic in approach, of-
fering thick descriptions of actors and organisations. As its proponents say, it opens the 
‘black box’ of the making of transnational commercial law, or at least one such black 
box.68 It has offered important insights on the ecologies of expert judgment at UN-
CITRAL. The focus on ecologies holds promise for a complementary relationship be-
tween law and society approaches and behavioural sciences approaches in the study of 
global commercial law-making. Law and society approaches may be able to assist in 
identifying socio-cultural variables at work in affecting the psychology of decision mak-
ing in law-making processes. But as we shall see, the cognitive focus advocated in this 
                                                          
66 Block-Lieb & Halliday (n 6). I cannot cover all methods of evaluating global commercial law making. At 
least two other approaches need to be taken seriously. One is grounded in critical theory and asks questions 
about the increasing role of private power in making of transnational commercial law. Critical approaches 
ground in the idea that the contemporary law merchant is political, essential to the juridical foundations of 
global capitalism. This critical work is in the main designed to expose the influence of private power over 
the state. It is perhaps best known though the work of A Claire Cutler. A Claire Cutler, Private Power and 
Global Authority (Cambridge University Press (2003). 
67 Block-Lieb & Halliday (n 6). 
68 Ibid. 4, 11. 
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chapter opens not the black box of the environment for law-making but that of the psy-
chology of law-making.  
C. The Cognitive Turn 
This chapter advocates an approach to evaluating global commercial law-making differ-
ing for our purposes in at least one fundamental respect from the above political economy 
and sociological approaches: the approach based in the behavioural sciences advocated in 
this chapter looks neither to institutions nor to structure to explain the actions of legal en-
trepreneurs in global commercial law-making. Rather, the focus is cognitive. It renders 
inessential to its task a focus on institutions but gets right into examining the psychology 
of expert judgment. It starts and ends with what is ‘in the head’: mental processes identi-
fied from repeat experiments in controlled laboratory settings, which tell us what moti-
vates legal entrepreneurs to take positions and actions in global commercial law-making 
processes. In barest of terms and risking oversimplification, mental events are causes: our 
beliefs and attitudes cause us to behave in particular ways and this behaviour can be pre-
dicted from these beliefs and attitudes. As we shall see below, the behavioural sciences 
hold promise for discovering why actors in the law-making processes behave in particular 
ways and how this behaviour influences the law-making process.  
III.  BEHAVIOURAL COMPARATIVE LAW AS A FIELD 
To date there has been little published work deploying behavioural science in compara-
tive law. Early work provides important insights.69 There is now a growing literature. A 
                                                          
69 Julie De Conink, ‘Reinvigorating Comparative Law through Behavioural Economics? A Cautiously Op-
timistic View’ (2011) 7 Review of Law and Economics 711; Julie De Coninck, ‘The Functional Method of 
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psychological intervention seems apt for comparative law. Ralf Michaels explains that 
‘the problem among traditional comparative lawyers is that each of us tends to adopt the 
perspective of our own legal system’.70 Legal comparativists are humans too. They make 
decisions and take positions that will be subject to heuristics and biases well known in the 
behavioural sciences, even though they are inclined by the field in which they operate to 
compare law and legal systems across borders. But for comparative law to be even more 
robust in its use of the behavioural sciences to explain difference across legal systems, 
comparativists will have to go further and inquire into the psychology of the actors in the 
legal systems they study and, for purposes of this chapter, those involved in reforming, 
harmonizing, unifying, or otherwise making law meant to have authority across a signifi-
cant number of states. Putting a group of lawyers from different jurisdictions in a deliber-
ative process in an intergovernmental organisation to produce a legal instrument that will 
be widely accepted across a large number of jurisdictions could be understood as the set-
ting for a natural experiment for comparativists.  
BCL may be understood as aligned with law and economics, if we understand behav-
ioural science about the law to be the use of behavioural economics to study the law. Put-
ting it into economics, however, may be an exercise in reductionism. BCL may align in 
some respects with behavioural economics but it is broader in conception, relying on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Privatrecht  318; Ralf Michaels, ‘Explanation and Interpretation in Functionalist Comparative Law – A 
Response to Julie de Coninck’ (2010) 74 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht  351; Julie De Coninck, Overcoming the Mere Heuristic Aspirations of (Functional) Compara-
tive Legal Research? An Exploration into the Possibilities and Limits of Behavioural Economics’ (2009) 9 
Global Jurist, Issue, Article 3; Julie De Coninck & Bart Du Laing, ‘Comparative Law, Behavioural Eco-
nomics and Contemporary Evolutionary Functionalism’ (2009) 26 Abstracts Annual Conference European 
Association of Law and Economics 10. See also Raffaele Caterina, I Fondamenti Cognitivi del Diritto 
(Mondadori Bruno 2008); Raffaele Caterina, ‘Comparative Law and the Cognitive Revolution’ (2004) 78 
Tulane Law Review 1501. 
70 Ralf Michaels, ‘The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto 
Law Journal, 197, 204. 
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full panoply of the behavioural sciences, including psychology and cognitive science, to 
inquire about differences in the law across jurisdictions. The approach of behavioural 
economics, on the other hand, is to look for exceptions to well-established theories in 
economics, and hence to see the move as one of relaxing the rationality assumption in 
economics,71 to look for ‘behavioural market failure’, or to replace expected utility theory 
with prospect theory.72 Still, given the importance of law and economics, and its domi-
nance in private and transactional law research in North America, some placement of 
BCL in the context of law and economics seems necessary. 
The rational choice economics of comparative law is an established field, though its 
beginnings where halting. In his 2002 article, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative 
Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century’, Mathias Reimann states that interdis-
ciplinary work in comparative law is the ‘rare exception’ and comparative law ‘has still 
not acquired a solid empirical basis’.73 Ralf Michaels, in his article, ‘The Second Wave of 
Comparative Law and Economics, argues that law and economics is ‘almost never used 
in comparative law.’74 Ugo Mattei, who wrote Comparative Law and Economics75 advo-
cated that comparative law has no future, at least in the United States, unless it links to 
                                                          
71 See Russell B Korobkin & Thomas S Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality As-
sumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 California Law Review 1051.  
72 See Matthew Rabin, ‘A Perspective on Psychology and Economics’ (2002) European Economic Review 
657; Colin Camerer, ‘Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics’ (1999) 96 Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 10575 
73 Mathias Reiman, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century’ (2002) 50 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 671, 686.  
74 Michaels (n 70) 199. Michaels explains that the exception is Ugo Mattei’s Comparative Law and Eco-
nomics (Michigan 1997) and he notes that Hein Kötz ‘strongly endorsed’ law and economics.  
75 Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (University of Michigan Press 1999). 
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the analytical social sciences tradition that is so robustly represented in the American le-
gal academy.76  
The linkage with rational choice economics is now well-established. The Oxford 
Handbook on Comparative Law offers a chapter by Florian Faust, ‘Comparative Law and 
the Economic Analysis of Law’.77 The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law deals 
with the economics of comparative law in two chapters, very briefly by Mathias Reimann 
in ‘Comparative Law and Neighbouring Disciplines’78 and in another by Nuno Garoupa 
and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Economic Analysis and Comparative Law’.79 The collection of pre-
viously published articles reprinted in Geest’s and Van den Bergh’s Comparative Law 
and Economics are mainly on legal origins, the economics of legal transplants, the rele-
vance of new institutional economics to law, and articles by legal scholars about law and 
economics research in a particular country. A research handbook on Comparative Law 
and Economics was published in 2016.80 None of the major handbooks on comparative 
law, however, offer a chapter on comparative law and behavioural science.   
Empirical comparative law has met with success as well, though distinguishing it 
from the economics of comparative law can be difficult. Holger Spamann’s article, ‘Em-
pirical Comparative Law,’ surveys quantitative work that might be classified as empirical 
                                                          
76 Ugo Mattei, ‘An Opportunity Not to Be Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in the United States’ 
(1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 709. 
77 Florian Faust, ‘Comparative Law and the Economic Analysis of Law in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 837. 
78 Mathias Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Neighbouring Disciplines’ in Mauro Bussani (ed), Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
79 Gerrit de Geest & Roger J Van den Bergh, Comparative Law and Economics (Elgar 2004). 
80 Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds, Comparative Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar 2016). 
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comparative law.81 He surveys the comparative empirical literature on constitutions in 
comparative politics and political economy, the areas of law and finance, doing business, 
and legal origins, and empirical work in diffusion and legal transplants.82 Work by Tom 
Ginsburg, Nuno Garoupa, Holger Spamann, and others offer a clear case for the existence 
of a substantial corpus in empirical and comparative law and economics.83  
Several directions for BCL are evident when it comes to the study of law reform. The 
discussion to follow outlines three areas for BCL that seem to require further exploration, 
and which include but go beyond the standard behavioural law and economics paradigm. 
First, behavioural science offers tools to aid in comparing legal rules across jurisdictions. 
Second, behavioural science offers tools to evaluate legal transplants that will help us to 
understand how to make transplants more likely to succeed. Third, behavioural science 
helps us to get around the epistemological obstacles that ‘legal culture’ has presented in 
comparative law. A caveat: This three-part categorization works for comparative law be-
cause it is based in the way comparative law is organized as a subject, but it is arbitrary 
for behavioural science as some of the insights of behavioural science are relevant across 
these categories. Research can either rely on original experiments or on settled findings 
from behavioural research. The discussion to follow will demonstrate the relevance of 
these areas to global commercial law-making.   
 
                                                          
81 Holger Spamann, ‘Empirical Comparative Law’ (2015) 11 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
131. 
82 Spamann and Geest and Van den Bergh invite a boundary problem. If you are going to study the eco-
nomics of a field of law, you can just as easily do that using law and data from a variety of jurisdictions. 
Comparing is simply subsumed within the social science methodology being used.  
83 This phenomenon may be primarily American in origin. See Nuno Goroupa & Thomas S Ulen, ‘The 
Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States,’ in Eisenberg & 
Ramello (n 80): 78.  
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A. BCL and Comparing Legal Rules 
Comparing legal rules is a routine occurrence in global commercial law-making. The ac-
tors in the institutions and processes of global commercial law-making often work from a 
few or several models from domestic legal systems. For example, the American UCC Ar-
ticle 9 has been widely influential in proposals for reform of the law on secured credit.84 
To understand the effects of the American approach to secured credit and how it might 
affect lending is a comparative task. Other products, such as the CISG, are often charac-
terized as hybrids between civil and common law.85 To characterize a law as a hybrid 
means that one must be able to know something of the difference between the two ap-
proaches being combined. Other global commercial law-making products, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, facilitate cooperation and coordi-
nation between jurisdictions but does not purport to unify insolvency law of different 
states.86 To know how this cooperation might work in practice requires comparing insol-
vency systems across different countries. The actors in the institutional environment set 
by organizations such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT engage in frequent rule comparing 
and in negotiating rule formulations in their deliberations. 
Behavioural science research can inform research on comparing legal rules in at least 
three ways, though the distinctions to follow may be artificial. First, behavioural science 
                                                          
84 N Orkun Akseli, 'International Harmonisation of Credit and Security Laws: the way forward', in Mads 
Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen (eds), Theory and Practice of Harmonisation (Edward Elgar 2012) 
551; RCC Cuming, ‘The Internationalization of Secured Financing Law: The Spreading Influence of the 
Concepts of UCC, Article 9 and its Progeny’, in Ross Cranston (ed), Making Commercial Law Essays in 
Honour of Roy Goode (Oxford 1997) 499. 
85 André Janssen & Navin G Ahuja, ‘Legal Laboratory CISG: Bridging the Gap: The CISG as a Successful 
Legal Hybrid between Common Law and Civil Law?’ (2017) 21 Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law and Arbitration 129; Ulrich Magnus, ‘The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) between 
Civil and Common Law – Best of all Worlds?’ (2010) 3 Journal of Civil Law Studies 67. 
86 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Chapter 15 at Last’ (2005) 79 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 713; Jenny 
Clifft, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency – A Legislative Framework to Facilitate 
Cooperation and Coordination’ (2004) 12 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 307. 
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can inform law-making. In Eyal Zamir’s scheme of classification, this is using behav-
ioural science as an input into law-making.87 Legal experts are subject to heuristics and 
biases. An example of such a use of behavioural science is in the development of con-
sumer protection legislation or regulation.88 Global commercial lawmakers can use be-
havioural science as a toolkit for understanding the effects of alternative sets of legal 
rules on behaviour. Second, legal rules can be examined to understand how they act on 
cognition. Loss aversion, for example, can in Zamir’s classification, be an output of legal 
rules. The first and second uses of behavioural science are two sides of the same coin and 
are conceptually difficult to disentangle. Think of the first use as ex ante, related to the 
design of law, and the second as ex post, related to the evaluation of law. A third use of 
behavioural science in comparative law research is in the evaluation of expert judgment 
in global law-making. This third use is relevant for global commercial law-making, when 
experts of different national traditions come together to produce law. Another way to un-
derstand this conceptual scheme is that there are producers and consumers of law, or ex-
perts and users, though producers and consumers, or experts and users, are sometimes the 
same people. 
As for the third use of behavioural science, two not entirely distinct ways to evaluate 
expert legal judgment are relevant. One is to focus on heuristics and biases, an approach 
associated with behavioural economics and the work of Dan Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky. In this approach, experts will likely be subject to heuristics and biases when 
                                                          
87 Eyal Zamir, Law, Psychology, and Morality (Oxford University Press 2015) 99. 
88 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, And Psychology in Consumer Markets (Ocford 
University Press 2013). On the notion of behaviourally informed regulation generally, see Cass R Sunstein, 
‘Nudges.gov: Behaviorally Informed Regulation’ in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman (eds), Oxford Hand-
book of Behavioural Economics and the Law (Oxford University Press 2014); Michael S Barr, Sendhil 
Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, ‘Behaviorally Informed Regulation’ in Eldar Shafir (ed), Behavioral Foun-
dations of Public Policy (Princeton University Press 2012) 440. 
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making law.89 The other is to focus on identity-protective cognition, an approach associ-
ated with the work of Dan Kahan and collaborators. In this second approach, we will ex-
plore how experts may (or may not) engage in motivated reasoning caused by their affili-
ations with their legal systems or countries. This second approach is known as the study 
of cultural cognition.  
 1. Heuristics and Biases 
Several well-understood biases may be at work in the above three contexts. We will focus 
on the third context, that of the exercise of expert judgment, given the almost exclusive 
use of expert judgment in commercial law-making. Confirmation bias will predictably be 
at work in the exercise of expert judgment. Confirmation bias is the use of evidence and 
argument in ways partial to beliefs a person already holds.90 People are unable to ignore 
pre-existing beliefs when evaluating evidence and argument that their pre-existing beliefs 
cannot validate. So, a lawyer will tend to weigh evidence and argument more favourably 
that the rules of her particular legal system solve a legal problem in a superior fashion 
than legal rules from another legal system. She will tend to discount the evidence offered 
about the efficacy of rules of other legal systems. 
Confirmation bias is part of a more general set of mental processes having to do with 
associative memory, the unconscious linking of ideas in our minds into categories and 
sequences. We cannot help ourselves but substitute association and familiarity for logic, 
truth conditionality, and the use of evidence. Familiarity is not easily distinguishable 
                                                          
89 Perez (n 64). On expert judgment in political contexts, see Philip E Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: 
How Good is it? How Can We Know? (Princeton University Press 2017). 
90 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Princeton University Press 2011); Jonathan Baron 
(2000), Thinking and Deciding (Cambridge University Press 3rd ed 2000); Raymond S Nickerson, ‘Con-
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aversion. Humans exhibit what Kahneman calls asymmetric intensity to avoid losses and 
achieve gains.91 When it comes to legal reform, there will be a bias favouring the law as 
it is to the delegate. The status quo in a comparative law context is the law as it is to the 
agent in question. For the English lawyer, for example, the status quo is English law. 
Lawyers feel the loss intensely if law reform moves away from ‘their’ law. Their law is a 
reference point in the reform process. 
Finally, research on how anchors influence the interpretation of vague legal standards 
is relevant to evaluating expert judgment in the form of global commercial law-making. 
Anchoring occurs when a subject is exposed to a reference point, which then influences 
subsequent judgments.92 Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr, and Doran Teichman have con-
ducted experimental research showing that anchors influence the interpretation by legal 
experts of vague legal norms.93 This work offers methodological insights on how to con-
duct further experimental research on how anchoring might affect legal experts in law 
reform projects. For example, experimental design could encompass giving subjects dif-
ferent legal standards and asking them to recommend standards for incorporation into a 
new legal product. 
 2. Identity-Protective Cognition 
The heuristics and biases approach developed in the preceding section is well developed 
in the law and behavioural economics literature. Another strand of research holds prom-
ise for research in comparative law on motivated reasoning, the tendency of individuals 
                                                          
91 Kahneman (n 90) 80-81. 
92 Ibid. at 119-128; Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, ‘A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect’ 
(2011) 40 Journal of Socio-Economics 35. 
93 Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr, & Doron Teichman, ‘Anchoring Legal Standards’ (2016) 13 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 298. 
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to conform their evaluation of evidence and use of reasons, as well as their sense of the 
matter and their intuitions, to some aim distinct and extrinsic to reaching a conclusion 
based only on reasons and evidence.94 Identity-protective cognition is a form of motivat-
ed reasoning, occurring when individuals selectively credit evidence and reasoning align-
ing with the group to which they belong.95 The insight at work here is not that we can 
override our biases in the fast and automatic system 1 mental processes with slow and 
deliberative system 2 processes, but instead, all our mental processes operate together to 
protect our identities. Evidence driven, deliberative system 2 mental processes magnify 
biases and do not defeat them.96 
Howard Margolis offers an influential psychological account of expert judgment.97 
He offers and integrated and reciprocal relationship between automatic system 1-type 
cognition and deliberative system 2-type cognition in experts.98 For Margolis, expert 
judgement consists of habits of mind based in pattern recognition, the fast and automatic 
assimilation of evidence to a mental inventory of prototypes. A legal expert applies these 
prototypes to facts and evidence in legal decision-making. System 2 does not overrise 
system 1 but rather these dual modes of though work together. Expert assessment needs a 
reliable system 1 or ‘preconscious’ apprehension to help the expert decide what requires 
more deliberative and evidence-driven mental processing. Once intuitive judgment is ap-
plied, the use of evidence and argument – the deployment of system 2 – will depend on 
                                                          
94 Dan M Kahan, ‘Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law’ (2015) 135 Cognition 56. 
95 Ibid.; Avani Mehta Sood, ‘Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments – An Analytic Review’ (2012) 9 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 307. 
96 Dan M. Kahan, ‘Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection’ (2013) 8 Judgment and De-
cision Making 407. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and The Experts Disagree on Environmental Is-
sues (University of Chicago Press 1997); Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking and Cognition: A Theory of 
Judgment (University of Chicago Press 1990). 
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the expert’s ‘assimilation of such evidence to an inventory of patterns that consist in pro-
totypical representations of cases that give proper effect to data of that sort’.99 In short, 
system 1 must reliably activate system 2.100  
Dan Kahan contends that Margolis’s account of professional judgment is like Karl 
Llewellyn’s account of the ‘situation sense’ of the judge.101 For Llewellyn, situation 
sense is a perceptive faculty that lawyers and judges develop through professional experi-
ence, enabling them to reliably connect legal controversies to ‘situation types’ to suggest 
appropriate legal resolution. Llewellyn saw legal reasoning as psychological not logical. 
For Llewellyn, formal legal reasoning primes or activates the situation sense of the legal 
expert.  
In a recent experimental study on whether political predispositions influence judicial 
decision making, Kahan and colleagues found that professional judgment imparted by 
legal training and experience produces resistance to identity-protective cognition.102 
Judges and experienced lawyers (but not law students) who were on the opposing sides of 
the US political spectrum did not engage in biased legal decision making. This study 
tested legal reasoning in a single country against political (nonlegal) predispositions in 
that country.  
                                                          
99 Dan M Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci, & Katherine Cheng, ‘“Ideol-
ogy” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judg-
ment’ (2016) 64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 349, 373. 
100 Ibid. Another way to understand identity-protective cognition is through Gerd Gigerenzer’s concept of 
expressive utility. Identity-motivated reasoning is expressively rational because it conveys and supports a 
person’s membership in a group. Gerd Gigerenzer, Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World (Ox-
ford University Press 2002). Another complementary approach is Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie’s 
story-based model, positing that decision-makers are endowed with a stock of story schema, which form 
templates for shaping the evidence presented in a legal case. Kahan (n 99) collects the research. The Pen-
nington-Hastie research appears to be more relevant for juries than judges, though judges are factfinders 
too. 
101 Kahan et al (n 99); Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little Brown 
1960). 
102 Kahan et al (n 99). 
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There is currently no answer to the question whether expert legal judgement would 
resist identity-protective cognition in a comparative legal context. It may be that we find 
identity-protective cognition in a comparative legal context for at least two reasons. First, 
the political and the legal are somewhat indistinct in the comparative realm, in the sense 
that one’s legal system may be perceived as part of one’s politics and associatively rele-
vant to one’s political allegiances. In the Kahan et al study, the subjects were judges and 
lawyers in the same national legal system. Law in that study was a clearly distinct varia-
ble from political allegiance or culture, which may not be the case in a comparative legal 
context. Second, reputational motivations about promoting one’s own law as a global 
standard may be in play. The experimental work has yet to be done. 
B.  Cognitive Constraints and Legal Transplants 
Much of global commercial law-making can be understood as some form of legal trans-
plant. In the global commercial law-making process, one or a few influential national 
models often arise, upon which to base the law-making process. Usually in the process 
the legal systems of the participants play an influential role. Transplants are either piece-
meal or wholesale. Borrowing can be explicit. In some cases, the law of a particular ju-
risdiction becomes a global standard as is the case for the law on secured transactions and 
American UCC Article 9. Borrowing can also be implicit or unintended, such as a result 
of the biases of the participants for their own law.  
 Suppose the working group of an international organization is in the early stages of 
preparing a model law. The process entails substantial negotiations among delegates. As-
sume that organization officials and member state delegates have several national codes 
under consideration for the potential borrowing of rules that seem to promote economic 
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activities that international financial institutions like the World Bank have found to pro-
mote economic growth. Behavioural science can assist us in predicting how member state 
delegates will deliberate on the borrowing. It can also assist in understanding how trans-
planted rules will be received in the borrowing country. 
As for the process of producing, for example, a model law based on transplanting a 
national law or approach to the law from a particular state or group of states, Kahneman 
informs that loss aversion may generally be an ‘ever present feature of negotiations.’103 
Along these lines. Tomer Broude has extended to treaty negotiations theories about the 
effects of status quo bias on contract default rules.104 We can extend Kahneman’s think-
ing about trade and arms control negotiations to deliberations about the contents of a 
model law.105 The domestic law of the member state delegates are reference points for the 
deliberation. Any proposed move away from the existing domestic law of a delegate will 
inevitably be viewed as a concession by that delegate. One’s own law primes one to think 
about what is appropriate for transplanting to a model law. You might think system 2 is 
guiding you but really you are simply primed by your legal tradition. As we know, losses 
are felt more intensely than gains. We can thus predict significant negotiations over the 
contents of model laws, rationalized in the language of reason and doctrine, but what in 
fact is likely going on is delegates have a status quo bias for their own law. 
The heuristics and biases literature can also inform us how transplants will be re-
ceived by states. Here we might see local experts, domestic lawyers of the importing 
country and judges who must interpret the new law once it is in force, experiencing loss 
                                                          
103 Kahneman (n 90) 304. 
104 Tomer Broude, ‘Behavioural International Law’ (2015) 163 Georgetown Law Journal 1099. 
105 Kahneman (n 90) 304-305. 
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aversion and resisting the importation. Until they are trained in the new law and accept it 
as their own, they may feel they are losing expertise and prestige while the exporters, the 
international organisation producing the model law and its experts, receive gains from 
reputational effects associated with the number of adoptions, but no real losses. An out-
side expert has no ‘dog in the hunt’ other than perhaps her reputation as an expert, but she 
is unaffected by the reform of the law itself. The behaviour of those who favour the status 
quo is like that of territorial animals who rigorously and swiftly protect against threats to 
territory.106 If status quo losers have political power or influence, they will use it. The 
actual outcome will likely be biased against real reform unless countermeasures are in 
place. As Kahneman explains, loss aversion is a ‘powerful conservative force’ favouring 
‘minimal changes from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and individuals.’107 
The World Bank and other law reformers do put some counter-measures in place, such as 
training and the use of local consultants and not just outsiders in law reform projects. 
Finally, identity-protective cognition might have a role in the drafting of the law, its 
implementation in-country, and its application by judges and lawyers. There has been 
empirical work by Daniel Berkowitz, Katherina Pistor, and Jean Francois Richard on the 
‘transplant effect’: they find that what matters more for the success of a legal transplant is 
its acceptance in the borrowing country than the association of the transplant with a legal 
family.108 This literature, grounded in rational choice, finds that for a successful trans-
plant, the imported law must be ‘meaningful’ to the citizens who use it who will then 
                                                          
106  Kahneman (n 90) 305. 
107  Ibid. 
108 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law 163; Daniel Berkowitz, Katherina Pistor, & Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Eco-
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demand institutions to make it work, and judges, lawyers and other legal intermediaries 
must be in a position to respond to this demand. Receptivity, a country’s ‘ability to give 
meaning to the imported law,’ requires significant adaptation of the foreign legal rules to 
pre-existing conditions. Research on motivated reasoning and identity-protective cogni-
tion holds the promise of shedding significant new light on what makes transplants viable 
and subject to reception and meaningfulness to end-users.  
C. Demystifying Culture Arguments 
One of the more casually and often repeated statements one hears in both global law-
making processes and in the comparative law community is that law is about culture. The 
invocation of culture can at times seem to be a strategy to censor discussion of difference. 
Culture has been one of the most discussed areas in comparative law and we cannot cover 
all the approaches to studying it here.109 Given the focus of this chapter on behavioural 
science, at least three strands of thinking about culture are relevant to our discussion.  
First, let us look at culture from the standpoint of rational choice theory as it has been 
deployed in traditional versions of law and economics. Rational choice economics can be 
understood as the predecessor to behavioural economics. Rational choice theorists have 
tended to ignore culture in comparative work. Chicago-school rationalists take a hard line 
against culture as having any real explanatory power, taking the standard position in fa-
vour of parsimonious economic models. J Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, for ex-
ample, explain in their book, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach: 
We do not use economics because we think everyone (or anyone) always 
rationally maximizes. We all know no one does. We use economics be-
cause we think classical Chicago-school economic intuition (taken alone 
                                                          
109 For an extensive discussion, see Siems (n 1) at 101-104, 119-135. 
 
 
- 42 - 
 
and simply, without much elaboration) goes far toward explaining much 
(not all) law-related behaviour in Japan. Surely, many readers will protest, 
Japan is a complex place, a multifaceted universe where every phenome-
non results from the subtle interplay of myriad disparate and interconnect-
ed causes. . . . But unless our critics tell us which of the myriad causes has 
what relative impact (they rarely do), the complexity is not much of an 
improvement. 
The same readers will probably insist that we could explain more if we 
added culture to our spare model. What we would gain in explanatory 
breadth, however, we believe we would lose in theoretical parsimony. . . . 
Consider [this book] an attempt to show just how far extremely spare eco-
nomic models go toward explaining the world of law-related behaviour.110  
Of course, the law and economics of social norms literature could be said to be address-
ing cultural norms, but these approaches focus not on culture but on the incentive effects 
of norms that are not official legal rules.111  
There are at least two problems with the rational choice approach: it is not predictive, 
as advances in behavioural science have shown in repeated experiments. Rational choice 
assumptions have been shown to matter greatly when it comes to individual decision-
making and behaviour. Moreover, rational choice theory cannot explain why the law dif-
fers across jurisdictions.112 It is too parsimonious, risking falsification.  
Second, work in empirical comparative law could be said to be seeking some reliabil-
ity in causal inferences relating to culture, though the gains are debatable and the re-
searchers in the field do not make direct claims or findings about culture. This literature 
is responsive to Ramseyer’s and Nakazoto’s plea for evidence of causation. Culture itself 
is not an independent variable and so this work, located primarily in the ‘law and finance’ 
                                                          
110 J Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazoto, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach (Harvard University 
Press 1999) xii-xiii. 
111 The norm theory literature in law and economics is substantial. A good place to start is with Robert C 
Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press new ed 1994). 
For another book-length treatment, see Eric A Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press 
2002). 
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literature, develops proxies such as variables for legal origins, tenure of supreme court 
judges, the power of judicial review, and so on.113 Legal origins variables are set up in the 
multiple regression models used in the ‘law and finance’ literature based on whether the 
origin of the legal system is England and Wales, France, or Germany. The problems with 
these variables in accounting for culture in statistical models is that we really do not 
know what is being tested. They may capture some element of culture, or they may simp-
ly be controlling for something else. The decision of what proxy variables might be test-
ing for culture are in the heads of the modellers. Behavioural scientists might look at this 
as potentially a problem of artefacts, a situation in which the views or biases of the re-
searchers unintentionally interfere with the validity of the research.114 Mathias Siems has 
offered an alternative set of variables.115 Culture, or some aspects of it, may be reflected 
in the error term in the law and finance multiple regressions.116 It is probably better just 
to say that a variable that tests for, say, legal origins, tests for legal origins as understood 
by the modellers and probably nothing more.  
 Third, postmodernists assert that culture is an overriding factor in the evaluation of 
legal systems.117 The focus of the critique here is on a mistake that legal postmodernists 
make in relying on an outdated distinction between explanation and understanding.118 An 
                                                          
113 The law and finance or legal origins literature is vast. For a survey, see Siems (n 1) 146-187. 
114 Robert Rosenthal & Ralph L. Rosnow, Artifacts in Behavioral Research (Oxford University Press 
2009). 
115 Mathias M Siems, ‘Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law’ (2006) 52 McGill 
Law Journal 55. 
116 This point is suggested by Alvin E Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 
‘Bargaining and Market Behaviour in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo; An Experimental 
Study’ (1991) 81 American Economic Review 1068, one of the first studies of cross-country variation in 
behaviour in bargaining contexts.  
117 For a survey, see Siems (n 1) at 101-108, 119-145. 
118 The distinction between explanation and understanding is a longstanding topic in epistemology and phi-
losophy of science. For an analogous discussion about ethics, see Peter Railton, ‘Toward an Ethics that 
Inhabits the World’ in Brian Leiter (ed) The Future for Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2004) 265. 
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empirical or analytical social scientist seeking to explain a phenomenon will cite causes, 
general principles, and evidence of actual behaviour. The task of explanation complies 
with norms of empirical science: third party objectivity, nomological principles, the con-
struction of general theories, all to promote the nomothetic ideal of causal adequacy. An 
explanation arising from this kind of social science might be unrecognizable to those 
immersed in the practice being studied. A social theorist focusing on understanding stud-
ies the world of those participating in a phenomenon by seeking meaning for the partici-
pants of the social practice under investigation, examining the qualities of lived experi-
ence. The task of understanding complies with the norms of hermeneutics: first person 
perspective, interpretive principles, phenomenological approaches, and an emphasis on 
the particular, all to promote the hermeneutic ideal of meaning adequacy. An understand-
ing arising from this kind of account would be recognizable to those immersed in the 
practice being studied. We see these distinctions between the empirical and postmodern 
wings of comparative law. 
Behavioural science has the potential to dissolve these distinctions or at least make 
them less important. It offers methods to explain causation in mental processes and 
events that are sufficiently replicable to be predictive of behaviour, but which also ac-
count for meaning and the lived experiences of those immersed in the social practice of 
law. It does not accept without further investigation the self-narratives of persons as au-
thoritative concerning meanings but is by its very conception mentalist in seeking to ac-
count empirically for people’s actual beliefs. While not a perfect substitute for humani-
ties-oriented approaches to comparative law inquiry, culture can no longer be used as a 
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blockage of comparative legal analysis, because psychology offers ways of explaining 
why actors think the way they do about ‘their’ law.  
So how would we investigate culture using the behavioural sciences? A place to start 
would be in the evolutionary wing of behavioural science suggesting that the scientific 
project should be more fully understood in a larger frame of culture-gene co-evolution.119 
In this research, culture is understood as a form of social learning to acquire behaviours 
that adapt to local conditions. Humans are endowed with learning capacities allowing us 
to acquire the beliefs and attitudes relevant and necessary for the given local social envi-
ronment. Social learning accumulates over generations and can create multiple stable 
equilibria in and across societies. Over time, humans would have culturally evolved dif-
ferent social organizations and institutions to adapt to diversity. While cultural capacities 
develop over a much shorter time span than genetic evolution, they, so the theory holds, 
influence the human genotype.120 This theory predicts that humans can learn in a way that 
accurately and efficiently acquires the motivations and preferences relevant to a local and 
culturally evolved social equilibria. Social equilibria are the various forms of social or-
ganisation and institutions found in societies, which includes law. Our beliefs and atti-
tudes become part of our preference functions.  
The research to-date in this evolutionary wing is normal science in a Kuhnian sense: 
it does not challenge the basic teachings of behavioural science. It offers evidence that 
                                                          
119 Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fahr, Herbert Gintis, Richard 
McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco 
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mental states and processes have an evolutionary origin. Repeat experiments have shown 
people universally not to be self-maximizing but to exhibit variability in altruistic and 
prosocial behaviours based on factors such as market integration, the publicity of cooper-
ation, and the industrialisation and scale of societies. Differences in economic and social 
organization, the complexity of social organisation, the need for cooperation in everyday 
life, and market integration affect results. This research is so far almost entirely limited to 
cross-cultural variations on fairness and reciprocity norms in experiments using ultima-
tum, dictator, and public goods games in small-scale societies.121 The basic finding is that 
the values that are rejected or not by the players in these games can differ when one 
changes the sample from that of university students that are WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
                                                          
121 Henrich et al (n 119); Jean Ensminger & Joseph Henrich (eds), Experimenting with Social Norms: Fair-
ness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective (Sage 2014); Joseph Henrich, Steven K Heine, & Ara 
Norenzayan, ‘The Weirdest People in the World?’ (2010) 33 Behavioural and Brain Sciences 61; Kang 
Chen & Fang-Fang Tang, ‘Cultural Differences Between Tibetans and Ethnic Han Chinese in Ultimatum 
Bargaining Experiments’ (2009) 25 European Journal of Political Economy 78; Michael Gurven, Arianna 
Zanolini, & Eric Schniter, ‘Culture Sometimes Matters: Intra-Cultural Variation in Pro-Social Behaviour 
Among Tisimane Amerindians’ (2008) 67 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 587; Joseph 
Henrich & Natalie Henrich (eds), Why Humans Cooperate Across Societies: A Cultural and Evolutionary 
Perspective (Oxford University Press 2007); Lee Cronk, ‘The Influence of Cultural Framing on Play in the 
Trust Game: A Maasai Example’ (2007) 28 Evolution and Human Behaviour 352; Joseph Henrich, Richard 
McElreath, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolynatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Mi-
chael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Henrich, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer, & John 
Ziker, ‘Costly Punishment Across Human Societies’ (2006) 312 Science 1767; Joseph Henrich, Robert 
Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, & Herbert Gintis (eds), Foundations of Human Sociali-
ty: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2004); Michael Gurven, ‘Economic Games Among the Amazonian Tsimane: Exploring the Roles 
of Market Access, Costs of Giving, and Cooperation on Pro-Social Game Behaviour’ (2004) 7 Experi-
mental Economics 5; Michael E Price, ‘Punitive Settlement Among the Shuar and in Industrialized Socie-
ties: Cross-Cultural Similarities’ (2004) 26 Evolution and Human Behaviour 279; Abigail Barr, ‘Trust and 
Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from Zimbabwean Villages’ (2003) 113 Economic Journal 614; 
Joseph Henrich, Wulf Abers, Robert Boyd, Gerd Gigerenzer, Kevin A McCabe, Axel Ockenfels, & H Pey-
ton Young, ‘Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?’ in Gerd Gigerenzer & 
Reinhard Selten (eds), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (MIT Press 2001); Joseph Henrich, 
‘Does Culture Matter in Economic Behaviour? Ultimatum Game Bargaining Among the Machiguenga of 
the Peruvian Amazon’ (2000) 90 American Economic Review 973. There is some experimental evidence of 
cross-cultural differences across large-scale market societies, though, at least along the discplinary lines 
explored here, is relatively less well-developed and is not clearly grounded in evolutionary explanations. 
See, e.g, Swee-Hoon Chuah, Robert Hoffman, Martin Jones, & Geoffrey Williams (2007) 64 Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 35. 
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Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) to samples from different subpopulations. One 
study has found no endowment effect in a small-scale traditional society not exposed to 
markets and modern society.122   
The science sketched above may be relevant for comparative law. Because of adap-
tive social learning processes, societies populated by people who historically adapted to 
divergent ecologies and historical circumstances may arrive at differing stable social 
equilibria. The result just might be that legal actors across societies may develop different 
forms of social organisation and institutions – different law – based on the psychology of 
legal decision-making in different historical trajectories. If properly developed, BCL 
could be at the vanguard of law-related behavioural science in attempting to replicate 
single-country experiments in different countries. For example, one BCL project could be 
the study the loss aversion of contract default rules across several countries using samples 
from each country. Notably, this means that claims about the effects of culture will be 
subjected to the demands of empirical validation.  
But the above cross-cultural research about small-scale societies may be of limited 
relevance to comparative law for at least two reasons. First, comparative law research 
tends to be about large-scale societies with substantial market integration, dealing with 
people who have experienced substantial exchange-type interactions with a variety of 
people. The above research may support the position that we should not worry too much 
about culture in comparative law research. Law tends to be a large project of mass socie-
ties to solve large-scale problems of coordination and cooperation. Law just might be less 
                                                          
122 Coren L Apicella, Eduardo M Azevado, Nicholas A Christakis, & James H Fowler, ‘Evolutionary Ori-
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important than social norms in smaller scale societies. Second, the above literature is lim-
ited in its focus mainly on reciprocity and fairness. A more promising line of research 
into legal culture might be a focus on identity as it is understood cognitively, as in the 
identity-protective cognition work outlined above.  
Extending the discussion to global commercial law-making, culture seems of dubious 
relevance. When it comes to the making of transnational commercial law, we are dealing 
with the regulation of people and firms – ‘merchants’ in the usual parlance – usually mul-
tinational enterprises, operating in explicit markets within a vast network of market inte-
gration comprising global supply chains. There will likely be little variation in the behav-
iour of these users of the law. But as we have discussed, there remains the possibility that 
the experts who will be making the law are subject to biases in favour of their own law 
and institutions. The origins of those biases may (or may not) be evolutionary, but that 
they are likely to exist is the more important question for us here.   
IV. IMPROVING GLOBAL COMMERCIAL LAW-MAKING 
This Part of the chapter moves on to applying the insights developed above to global 
commercial law-making. It focuses on two points: (i) how biases and motivated reason-
ing might interfere with the making of global commercial law and its operation and im-
plementation in practice and (ii) how to de-bias and render less influential the cognitive 
constraints on expert judgment in global law-making. The focus in this second section is 
on the use of cost-benefit analysis when feasible.  
A. Cognitive Imperialism 
Your own legal system dominates your thinking. Call this cognitive imperialism: the 
domination of a lawyer’s reasoning about what is good and right about the law, based on 
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what they sense or know about their own law. ‘Domination’ connotes that a lawyer has 
no or few cognitive mechanisms by which to defeat this imperialism.   
 Applying these insights to global commercial law-making, lawyers involved in glob-
al commercial law-making will prefer their own law, regardless of any Pareto improve-
ments for the prospective users of the law. The same holds for the implementation of the 
new law: all things being equal, lawyers and judges will subvert reform in favour of their 
own law. They will predictably substitute one question, ‘what is a good rule’ for another, 
‘what is the rule I am familiar with’ which will inevitably be the rule in their own juris-
diction.  
The argument in this form is at a stage of a rudimentary working hypothesis, based 
simply on what we know about the psychology of expert legal judgment. It would take 
significant refinement of the question and experimental research to explain these insights 
in actual operation. The first step in developing a theory or model in the social sciences is 
to rely on one’s intuition based on what we see anecdotally.123 That is what I do here.  
 1. Cognitive Imperialism in Law-Making 
Examples of potential loss aversion or identity-protective cognition in global commercial 
law-making processes seem apparent. I will focus on one: the debate in UNCITRAL 
Working Group 1 about whether minimum legal capital requirements should be recom-
mended as a requirement for incorporation in the draft Legislative Guide on an UN-
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CITRAL Limited Liability Organization (UNLLO) and in the UNCITRAL Draft Legisla-
tive Guide on Key Principles of a Business Registry.124 
American corporate law eliminated minimum capital requirements as a requirement 
for registering a corporation long ago. This abolition applies equally to publicly and pri-
vately held corporations. Other countries have also eliminated these requirements. The 
modern trend in corporate law appears to be for corporate enabling statutes not to contain 
minimum capital requirements for corporate formation. Minimum capital requirements 
are likely to be widely perceived by experienced American business lawyers as provi-
sions left over in an antiquated state corporate legislation in need of updating, but which a 
state legislature has ignored. Younger American lawyers may not even know of their pri-
or existence. If you attended law school in the United States in 1970s and into the early 
1980s, you may have been instructed from a slim paperback by Bayless Manning, A Con-
cise Textbook on Legal Capital, first published in 1977.125 By about the late-1980s, the 
book became widely viewed as an anachronism in American legal education. The ab-
sence of minimum capital requirements in the United States can be widely seen as a 
move from a paternalistic view of corporate law as a matter of regulation to an autono-
my-based view of corporate law comprised mainly of default rules.126 Minimum legal 
capital rules are widely understood as obsolete in the United States. Any lawyer working 
in the American tradition of corporate law will probably have a reference point that will 
                                                          
124 For the UNCITRAL history on the development of these guides, see 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/working groups/1/msmes (last accessed 1 Feb 2019). 
125 Bayless Manning, A Concise Legal Textbook on Legal Capital (Little Brown 1977). This book, howev-
er, has more to do with legal capital requirements post-formation, which can affect distributions to share-
holders. 
126 See Lawrence A Hamermesh, ‘The Policy Foundations for Delaware Corporate Law’ (2006) 106 Co-
lumbia Law Review 1749. 
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be strongly against minimum capital requirements as needless obstacles to corporate for-
mation.  
The European Union is not so far from the United States in terms of the letter of the 
law, thought the move came much later and Europe remains an outlier on requiring min-
imum capital for some companies. Article 6 of the Second Company Law Directive 
(77/91/EEC) requires that publicly held companies have at least 25,000 euros in legal 
capital to incorporate, but there seems to be a trend in Europe away from minimum capi-
tal requirements for closely held firms, represented by such entities as the Unternehmerg-
esellschaft (UG) in Germany and the société à responsabilité limitée (SARL) in 
France.127  
The focus on the work of UNCITRAL Working Group 1 under consideration here is 
on micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs). Its work on the LLO seems to 
connect to the advent of the American limited liability company and similar forms of or-
ganization found in other countries. Why would some UNCITRAL delegates focus on 
minimum capital requirements? UNCITRAL started out in its early deliberations taking 
the position that ‘[i]mportantly, simplified corporate forms do not typically include a 
minimum capital requirement, or require only a nominal amount, thus allowing greater 
access to formalization for much smaller entrepreneurs and enterprises.’128 There appar-
                                                          
127 See Note by the Secretariat, Observations by the Government of the French Republic, 12 Aug 2015, 
A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.94; Note by the Secretariat, Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Features of 
Simplified Business Incorporation Regimes, 10 Dec 2013, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.82, at p 6 (discussing the UG 
in Germany).It is doubtful a 25,000 euro requirement has any real significance for publicly held corpora-
tions. John Armour, Gerard Hertig, & Hikeki Kanda, ‘Transactions with Creditors’ in Reinier Kraakman, 
John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, 
Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe, & Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative 
and Functional Approach (Oxford University Press 3rd ed 2017) 109.  
128 Note by the Secretariat, Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Features of Simplified Business 
Incorporation Regimes, 10 Dec 2013, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.82, p 6. 
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ently was resistance to this position, with the position taken being the standard European 
arguments in favour of minimum capital requirements.129 These included the argument 
that minimum capital requirements are necessary to offset the effects of limited liabil-
ity.130 The dividing lines apparently having been drawn, the World Bank, which as a mat-
ter of practice participates in UNCITRAL working groups, offered substantial evidence 
on why minimum capital requirements are poor corporate policy. Its expertise in corpo-
rate registration derives from its Ease of Doing Business Index and Doing Business Re-
ports.131 While the World Bank’s work in these areas has generated controversy, for our 
limited purposes here, the World Bank, an intergovernmental organization with a broad 
membership of most countries in the world, has no national law of its own to promote. It 
is worth quoting UNCITRAL’s summary at length of the World Bank evidence, in a doc-
ument UNCITRAL styled as ‘Best Practices in Business Registration’: 
Several reforms in recent years have questioned the function of the mini-
mum capital requirement, which is said to considerably slow the registra-
tion of new businesses. Although supporters of the minimum capital re-
quirement insist that it is necessary to protect creditors and investors, it 
has increasingly been observed that the requirement does not fulfil any 
regulatory function by protecting creditors, customers or the business itself 
against poor performance of the business. For instance, the requirement 
does not shield the business from insolvency: in several countries the min-
imum capital can be paid in kind or withdrawn immediately after registra-
tion. Furthermore, recovery rates in bankruptcy are not higher in countries 
with minimum capital requirements when compared with those with no 
such requirements. Minimum capital requirements do not protect investors 
and consumers from new firms that are carelessly set up or might not be 
financially viable, since the minimum capital is often a fixed amount that 
does not take into account the firms’ economic activities, size or risks. In 
some cases the amount of the capital requirement is the same even when 
                                                          
129 See Luca Enriques & Jonathan R Macy, ‘Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the 
European Legal Capital Rules’ (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 1165 
130 Report of Working Group 1 (MSMEs) on the Work of its Twenty-Second Session (New York, 10-14 
February 2014), 28 Feb 2014, A/CN.9/800. 
131 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last accessed 14 may 2019). 
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the companies are of a different type. In one State, for instance, a small 
company in the services industry with a low start-up capital has to pay the 
same amount as a large manufacturing company with high initial capital. 
Research shows that States protect investors and creditors, particularly in 
the case of limited liability companies, through means other than the min-
imum capital requirements. Some economies adopt provisions on solvency 
safeguards in their legislation, others conduct solvency tests or require an 
audit report showing that the amount a company has invested is enough to 
cover its establishment cost.  
Of the 189 economies reviewed in Doing Business 2014, 99 have no min-
imum capital requirement. Some economies never required businesses to 
deposit money for incorporation, while others have eliminated minimum 
capital requirements in the recent past. In other cases new forms of limited 
liability companies with lower minimum capital requirements and simpli-
fied incorporation procedures have been introduced. Some States allow in-
itial incorporation of a simplified limited liability company for only 1 eu-
ro, provided that progressive capitalization occurs, for example, the com-
pany must set aside a certain percentage of its annual profits until its re-
serves and the share capital jointly total the required amount. In another 
State, the introduction of a lower capital requirement resulted in a 40 per 
cent increase in registration in the year following the reform. 
According to a study of selected European Union (EU) States, lowering or 
abolishing the minimum capital requirement has led to a marked increase 
in the number of registered business in four of the States considered: in the 
year after the reform, average daily incorporations in those States in-
creased by as much as 85 per cent.132  
Despite the substantial evidence against minimum capital requirements, resistance 
among some delegates seems to have continued, with the more prominent argument that 
without a minimum capital requirement, creditor protections would be all ex post and not 
ex ante.133 There appeared to be some consensus with the World Bank view along with 
some dissension, though delegate views are sometimes difficult to discern in official doc-
uments. The Working Group agreed that ‘the issues of minimum capital requirement and 
                                                          
132 Note by the Secretariat, Best Practices in Business Registration, 5 Sept 2014, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.85 
(citations omitted). The Note by the Secretariat, Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Legal Ques-
tions Surrounding the Simplification of Incorporation, 8 Sept 2014, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.86, reiterated the 
focus on the World bank evidence. 
133 Report of Working Group I (MSMEs) on the Work of its Twenty-Third Session (Vienna, 17-21 Nov 
2014), 2 Dec 2014, A/CN.9/825, ¶ 77. 
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protection of third parties should be treated under the general category of protection of 
creditors and other third parties.’134 The delegates did not agree on standards for protec-
tion but that the legal text should ensure ‘sufficient flexibility for a State to choose its 
own criteria as it saw fit.’135 
Some of the disagreement appears to have come from the German delegation. UN-
CITRAL published a note on the German position that appears to advocate minimum 
capital requirements and more regulatory burdens for SMSEs, arguing for ‘ex ante pre-
ventive measures of justice’, but also making some pro-SMSE statements.136 One argu-
ment was that ‘it has become apparent’ through the Working Group 1 sessions ‘that a 
business cannot be separated from its national economic and cultural context’ and that the 
aim should be to ‘bridge gaps between different legal traditions in terms of business in-
corporation.’137 These arguments seem to contradict a well-settled claim that corporate 
law is substantially similar across nations, probably more so than other areas of law. As 
explained in the first paragraph of probably the most influential comparative work in the 
field, ‘despite the very real differences across jurisdictions . . . . the underlying uniformity 
of the corporate form is at least as impressive. Business corporations have a fundamental-
ly similar set of legal characteristics – and face a fundamentally similar set of legal prob-
lems – in all jurisdictions.’138 The culture argument, moreover, appears to be an attempt 
to censor discussion of the evidence. The German position was also that ‘[e]xtensive con-
tractual freedom might be problematic in countries where founders of business entities 
                                                          
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. ¶ 78. 
136 Note by the Secretariat, Observations by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 19 Feb 
2015, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.90. 
137 Ibid. 
138 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, & Marianna Pargendler, ‘What is Corporate Law’ in 
Kraakman et al (n 127) at 1. 
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lack the education or access to legal counsel to make best use of such freedom’.139 This 
argument appears to be a critique of the approach to corporate law that focuses on auton-
omy rather than paternalism.  Finally, the note contains a section that is entitled ‘honour-
ing what is already there,’ which seems to offer an example of status quo bias.140   
The minimum capital requirement eventually receded in importance in UNCITRAL 
deliberations. UNCITRAL reported that that no consensus existed on whether minimum 
capital requirements should be required to offset limited liability but that ‘there was 
broad agreement that the modern trend in legal reform in this area was to move away 
from minimum capital requirements.’ 141 UNCITRAL began preparation of a  draft model 
law on a simplified business entity that did not contain a minimum capital requirement, 
but consistently with the ‘modern trend’ was ‘sufficiently flexible’ to allow states to in-
clude such a requirement, but advocating restriction to a ‘nominal sum.’142 How a nomi-
nal sum would serve any purpose other than to respond to loss aversion or identity-
protective cognition by some of the members of Working Group 1 is unclear.  
The current state of affairs as of the date of this writing is that UNCITRAL delibera-
tions are ongoing on parallel tracks on a draft Legislative Guide on an UNCITRAL Lim-
ited Liability Organization and a draft Legislative Guide on Key Principles of a Business 
Registry. The draft Legislative Guide on an UNCITRAL Limited Liability Organization 
sets forth a recommendation 5: ‘The law should not contain a minimum capital require-
                                                          
139 Note by the Secretariat, Observations by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 19 Feb 
2015, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.90. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Note by the Secretariat, Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Draft Model Law on Simplified 
Business Entity, 28 Jan 2018, ¶ 15. 
142 Ibid. ¶ 16. 
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ment for the formation of an UNLLO’.143 The draft Legislative Guide on Key Principles 
of a Business Registry discourages countries from adopting minimum capital require-
ments offering rationales consistent with the evidence-based World Bank position.144 
The point of this example is not to debate the merits of legal capital requirements but 
to illustrate how various biases or motivated reasoning might be in play in global com-
mercial law-making. Of course, the above narrative is not proof but merely a set of ob-
servations that reasonably could lead us to believe that biases and motivated reasoning 
are at work. The next step would be in developing a set of clearly specified hypotheses 
and to conduct a set of experiments by which to test the hypothesis.  
2. Cognitive Imperialism in Implementation 
There is space in this chapter to only briefly explore a few illustrations in which biases 
and motivated reasoning may be at work in the implementation of global commercial law 
at the national level. The illustration is that of the non-use of the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) by contract parties. The discussion to follow is by no 
means exhaustive. 
 Commentators have expressed a longstanding concern about a ‘homeward trend’ in 
judicial interpretations of the CISG.145 The problem goes further: there seems to be at-
tempts at wholesale exclusion of the CISG by lawyers across several countries. Several 
                                                          
143 Note by the Secretariat, Draft Legislative Guide on an UNCITRAL Limited Liability Organization, 25 
July 2016, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.99/Add.1; Note by the Secretariat, Draft Legislative Guide on an UN-
CITRAL Limited Liability Organization, 24 July 2018, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.112. 
144 Note by the Secretariat, Draft Legislative Guide on Key Principles of a Business Registry, 10 Feb 2017, 
A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.101; Note by the Secretariat, Draft Legislative Guide on Key Principles of a Business 
Registry, pp 81-82; Note by the Secretariat, Draft Legislative Guide on Key Principles of a Business Regis-
try, 2 Jan 2018, A/CN.9/WG.1/WP.109, at p 74. 
145  The phrase is attributable to John Honnold but the phenomena has been examined in many articles too 
numerous to cite here. See, e.g., ‘The Sales Convention in Action -- Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application? (1988) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 207.  
 
 
- 57 - 
 
empirical studies offer evidence of very low reliance on the CISG in the United States, 
for example.146 This homeward trend might be explained with behavioural science. John 
Coyle’s work on the non-use of the CISG by American contract parties offers clues. 
Coyle developed a dataset of over 5,000 contracts and interviewed several lawyers in-
volved in contract drafting. His research revealed that many US contracting parties (or 
their lawyers) ‘reflexively exclude’ the CISG, which means that they excluded the CISG 
from contracts even when it would clearly not apply. His research also revealed that US 
contracting parties almost never explicitly choose the CISG and they are often unaware 
that selecting the law of a US state can result in the application of the CISG.  
 Experimental research on how lawyers make decisions about the drafting of choice of 
law clauses would be the next step. Statutory interpretation problems have been the sub-
ject of experiments and there is no reason to believe that a valid experiment could not be 
developed to test expert legal judgment about choosing an international convention or 
foreign law in the drafting of a choice of law clause. There is some indication in this re-
search that lawyers react to law nationalistically, as in choosing ‘New York’, though any 
such experiment will have to control for the location of the client, among other things.     
 Other illustrations can be offered. The thwarting of the universalism of the United 
Nations Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in the UK Supreme Court decision in 
                                                          
146 Coyle (n 52); Spagnolo (n 55); Peter L Fitzgerald, ‘The International Contracting Practices Survey Pro-
ject: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, 
Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States’ (2008) 27 Journal of Law and Commerce 1; Martin F 
Koehler, ‘Survey regarding the relevance of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) in Legal Practice and the Exclusion of its Application’, 
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler.html (last accessed 22 Nov 2018); Georg V Philippopou-
los, ‘Awareness of the CISC Among American Attorneys’ (2008) 40 Uniform Commercial Code Law 
Journal  357. 
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Rubin v Eurofinance SA147 just might offer another illustration. In Rubin,  the UK Su-
preme Court took a sharp break from precedent by rejecting the UK enforcement of de-
fault judgments entered by the Southern District of New York and the New South Wales 
Supreme Court, even though the centre of main interests (COMI) of the bankrupt estates 
were in the United States and Australia. The Rubin judgment is likely an example of mo-
tivated reasoning. Again, and more generally beyond Rubin or any single case, experi-
ments testing the ‘nationalism’ of judging can be designed. It appears to reflect a similar 
homeward trend-type problem found in many CISG cases decided in many national 
courts.  
B. De-biasing: Moving to System 2 
Given what behavioural science tells us, an important aim of any global commercial law-
making process should be to de-bias the process. The process should move away from 
reliance only on expert legal judgment of the traditional sort. Some form of ‘third-party’ 
neutrality is warranted. Even an attempt at system 2 reasoning by experts is problematic. 
Even experts trained to use evidence and reasoning may deploy evidence and reasoning 
in identity-protecting ways. The job of evaluation of new law should therefore be out-
sourced and cost-benefit analysis should be employed when feasible.  
The ‘when feasible’ proviso is an important qualification. De-biasing should make the 
process better and not worse off. Feasibility has to do with both identifying what can be 
measured and measuring itself - both conceptual and empirical considerations are rele-
vant. There will be many cases in which cost-benefit analysis is not feasible. So far there 
have been few advances in employing cost-benefit analysis to evaluate private or transac-
                                                          
147 [2012] UKSC 46. 
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tional law.148 There is a considerable movement towards using cost-benefit analysis in the 
analysis of protocols to the Capetown Convention.149  For the Aircraft Protocol of that 
Convention, it can be demonstrated that secured financing of aircraft lowers the cost of 
credit for purchasers. How these lower private costs translate into lower social costs and 
increased social benefits is the more central question, about which it may be impractical 
to say much. Cost-benefit analysis probably did not come to be understood as a tool for 
evaluating proposed regulation until the early 1980s, when US President Ronald Reagan 
issued Executive Order 12,291 mandating the use of cost-benefit analysis on all major US 
federal proposed regulation.150 We should not have expected any global law-making body 
to have adopted cost-benefit analysis at the time to evaluate private or transactional law. 
One potentially formidable feasibility constraint might be on the use of cost-benefit 
analysis at the international level: how to measure costs and benefits when it is unknown 
who will adopt a model law, ratify a convention, or follow a legislative guide. It is all too 
often the case that what is in force globally is a diversity of international conventions 
governing a particular area of commerce. Model laws are meant to be national laws and 
costs and benefits may be impractical to quantify unless tied to a national evaluation. Still 
                                                          
148 There has been considerable discussion on the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate financial regula-
tion. See, e.g, (n 17) and two symposium issues at (2014) 43 No S2 and (2000) 29 S2 of the Journal of Le-
gal Studies. A significant difference exists, however, between conducting cost-benefit analysis of financial 
regulation and commercial law. UNCITRAL’s remit, moreover, at least informally, excludes regulation.  
149 Jeffrey Wool, ‘Treaty Design, Implementation, and Compliance Benchmarking Economic Benefit – A 
Framework as Applied to the Capetown Convention’ (2012) 17 Uniform Law Review 633; Jeffrey Wool, 
‘Economic Analysis and Harmonised Modernization of Private Law’ (2003) 8 Uniform Law Review 389; 
Anthony Sanders, Anand Srinivasan, Ingo Walter, & Jeffrey Wool, ‘The Economic Implications of Interna-
tional Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study’ (1999) 20 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 309; Jeffrey Wool, Rethinking the Notion of Uniformity in the Drafting of 
International Commercial Law: A Preliminary Proposal for the Development of a Policy-Based Unification 
Model’ (1997) 2 Uniform Law Review 46. 
150 Adler & Posner (n 20). 
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we want to be able to use cost-benefit analysis or come as close as possible to using it at 
the more abstract global level if we want it to de-bias global commercial law-making.   
When cost-benefit analysis is not feasible, a solution might be to look for an alterna-
tive methodology.151 In 2003, attempting to repair the above political economy critique of 
private law harmonisation, I recommended as follows: 
Model laws and international conventions tend to be accompanied by offi-
cial commentary. States could require demonstrations in the commentary 
of efficiency improvements in the law. It would be naive to suggest that 
because the commentary says that the law is an efficiency improvement, 
that the law makers actually took efficiency into account in producing the 
law. That they are required to provide such an analysis, however, does at 
least five things to improve upon the status quo. First, it signals that unify-
ing bodies are amenable to efficiency-oriented approaches. Second, it pro-
duces information about the content of the law. Third, it has the potential 
to focus the drafting of law on improvements in the law rather than on le-
gal change by itself as a goal. Fourth, it assists in getting law and econom-
ics scholars to review proposed laws. Fifth, it is difficult to ‘fake’ efficien-
cy. The public choice-oriented explanations for unification will remain 
relevant, and actors involved in unification projects will not somehow mi-
raculously begin to act only in the public interest. There are no panaceas. 
And, uncertainty will remain for some laws as to whether they actually 
will be efficient when implemented by courts. But still, drawing attention 
to efficiency should channel some law-unifying behaviour towards the 
production of better or at least more efficient law.152 
Any such work would have to be done by ‘experts’ who are independent of the law-
making process and with the appropriate expertise and should be as quantitative as is sen-
sible to the production of reliable results. Moreover, regardless of the methodology em-
ployed, the work should be conducted under conditions of transparency, in which inter-
ested parties have access to the data and are in a position to evaluate the results.153 
                                                          
151 Coates makes this same point about cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation. Coates (n 17). 
152 Linarelli (n 55) at 1445-1446. 
153 See Gregory Klass, ‘Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have strived to identify two innovations. One is the development of a 
new field of behavioural comparative law or BCL. The other is in the application of be-
havioural science insights to global commercial law-making. Scholars have paid scant 
attention to the potential for behavioural science to contribute to comparative law re-
search, though work in behavioural law and economics, a major field in behavioural sci-
ence, has emerged. Nothing to-date has been written about the application of behavioural 
science to global commercial law-making.  
There appear to be promising lines of research still be done in both areas. Intuition 
informs us that heuristics and biases, as well as other cognitive insights associated with 
culture and national identity, are in play in global law-making. More generally, behav-
ioural science seems to hold significant potential for understanding how legal problems 
are solved in different states. Future work would seem to require data-driven and exper-
imental investigation. It is my hope that this chapter serves as a catalyst to instigate fur-
ther work in the use of behavioural comparative law methods to study global commer-
cial law-making.  
 
